

A N
E S S A Y
UPON THE
Present Interest
O F
E N G L A N D.

To which are added,
The Proceedings of the *House of Commons* in 1677.
upon the French King's Progress in *Flanders*.

The Second Edition.

Nulla est acerbitas, quæ non omnibus hac Orbis terrarum perturbatione, impendere videatur.

Cic. Epist. Famil.

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Printed, and are to be Sold by *John Natt*, near
Stationers-Hall, 1701.

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ENGLAND.



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An ESSAY upon the Present Interest
of ENGLAND.

THE Peace of *Rismick* had scarce compos'd the Differences of Christendom, when the King of *Spain's* Sickness, who is at length dead without Issue, alarm'd it afresh. The uncertainty of who shou'd succeed to the vast Dominions he was Master of, some of which furnish all this part of the World with Gold and Silver, cou'd not but give great Concern to all his neighbouring States and Princes. The known Competitors for this great Inheritance were, the present Emperor; the Dauphin, and the Prince Electoral of *Bavaria*. The former is by all own'd to be the next Heir Male of the House of *Austria*, which has reign'd in *Spain* near two Ages, and wou'd be allow'd, even by the *French*, to have an unquestionable Title, if the Salique Law, which excludes Females from the Government, were of Force in *Spain* as it is in *France*. But that wise Constitution in the French Government prevails not amongst its Neighbours, who will blindly persevere to give *France* the same Advantage over them, which the Church enjoys over the Laity in Popish Countries, viz. That it may ever be acquiring, and can never alienate. The Defect of it in *Spain*, will I fear, cost Christendom very dear at this Conjunction, since it opens a Door to the French Pretensions; it being well known, that the Dauphin's Claim was by his Mother, who was Daughter to *Philip IV.* Sister to the Deceas'd King, and Marry'd to the present King of *France* immediately after the *Pysenian* Treaty, by which Treaty most solemnly sworn to by both Kings, the *Spaniards* thought they had sufficiently secur'd themselves from the French Domination: And indeed so they had, if Oaths or Treaties hitherto ac-

counted the most Sacred Tyes that God could enjoin, or Mankind cou'd devise, were of any Force. For 'tis notorious, that *Lewis XIV.* and his Queen, did, upon their Marriage, in the most solemn manner, renounce all Pretensions that might accrue by it to them and their Children upon the *Spanish* Dominions. And 'tis as notorious that the same *Lewis XIV.* did within these two Years order the Count *d'Harcourt*, his Ambassador at *Madrid*, to assert the Right of his Son the *Dauphin* to the *Spanish* Succession. The occasion for his so doing was, that the King of *Spain* had made a Will, declaring the Prince Electoral of *Bavaria*, the Third Pretender I mention'd, Successor to the whole Monarchy. The *French* Ambassador obey'd his Orders, and gave in a Memorial, complaining of it as an Injustice done to the *Dauphin*, whom he asserted to have an undoubted Right to succeed to that Crown. The Memorial I mention the rather, because it shews what a Deference his most Christian Majesty had at that time for the King of *Spain's* Will. The young Prince dy'd soon after, which put a stop to the *French* Instances, otherwise the Peace of *Europe* might have been disturb'd before the *Spanish* Throne had been vacant. His Death left the Competition between the Houses of *Austria* and *Bourbon*, and all the Potentates of *Christendom* full of Care for this great Decision. The boundless Ambition of the *French* King, who has been long observ'd to aim at Universal Monarchy, gave the World reason to fear that he would attempt the Union of both Monarchies, which, if compass'd, wou'd make it very easie to execute the remaining part of his vast Projects. His Power so lately felt in a Ten Years War, wag'd against a Confederacy of the most powerful States of *Europe*, made it evident, That the Emperour alone wou'd not be able to defeat his Enterprize, especially if we consider the Advantages the Situation of *France* gives him over his Competitor, whose Territories are not immediately contiguous

ous to any part of the *Spanish* Dominions; whereas *France* is not only contiguous to *Spain*, but separates it from the rest of the World, with no part of which, except *Portugal*, it can have any Commerce, otherwise than by Sea; but the Emperour has not a Sea-port, nor a Ship in the World, and must therefore be beholden to others, whenever he will attempt any thing upon *Spain*. Those others cou'd be only the *English* or *Dutch*, they alone being able to cope with *France* at Sea; so those two Nations seem'd to be under a necessary Dilemma whenever the King of *Spain* should die, either to sit still and see the *French* quietly take Possession of *Spain* and the *West-Indies*, or to renew an expensive and hazardous War, unless some Expedient were found out before the Case happen'd, to satisfy the Pretenders in such a Manner as should be least prejudicial to ours and the *Dutch* Interest. Such an Expedient the Treaty of *Partition* was thought to be, and as such agreed to by *France*, the K. of *England*, and the *Dutch*. The Advantages which redounded to the *French* by the Treaty, which annexed to their Crown the Kingdom of *Naples* and *Sicily*, with the Provinces of *Lorraine* and *Guipuscoa*, besides some Towns in *Italy*, made it reasonable to believe they wou'd have stuck to it rather than have ventur'd to draw on themselves another general War.

The King, who had the Interest of *England* and *Holland* to manage on this occasion, was unwilling to engage 'em in a new War, which they would have been neither over-willing, or able to sustain, if the King of *Spain* had dy'd soon after the Peace; and therefore thought it most advisable to yield up to *France*, such Provinces of the *Spanish* Dominion as wou'd be least prejudicial to these Nations: And such 'tis evident those above-nam'd are, which if any one doubt, let him but consider whether the single Town of *Cadis* in French Hands, wou'd not prove more destructive to us than all we have nam'd; to say nothing of *Flanders*, or the *West-Indies*; all which, with
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the Body of *Spain*, could have been secur'd to the House of *Austria* no other way than by a War, or such a Treaty.

I am not ignorant that many Objections have been made against it, to answer all which were a proper Task for one thoroughly acquainted with all the Steps and Transactions of that Negotiation, which I profess I am not, and I shall therefore in Vindication of it only repeat that it was design'd and calculated purely to preserve the Peace of these Countries, which single Argument ought surely to reconcile to it all those who were weary of the last War, who complain'd of the Heavey Taxes it occasion'd, and of the great debt it hath left the Nation loaded with; and who, out of their great Tendernefs to *England*, opposing all such equal and easiy Methods of raising Money as would have kept us out of Debt, took care the War shou'd be felt, lest, said they, the King, whose Ambition and Delight was to head Armies, might by the Ease he should find, in paying them, be tempted to perpetuate the War.

If then the Neceffity of our Affairs, flowing from the mistaken Measures they took in furnishing Supplies to His Majesty upon Land-banks, and other deficient Funds, forced him to make a Peace, which by this Treaty he has endeavour'd to perpetuate, will they find Faults? And complain of the Moderation of a Prince, who has done Violence to his own Martial Inclinations for the Ease of his People? Or are the Gentlemen I speak of on a suddain become such Champions for the Honor of *England*, and the Interest of *Europe*, as to object, that the Continuation of a Peace shou'd not have been purchas'd at so inglorious a rate; as by giving up to *France*, *Naples*, *Sicily*, &c. whereby the Ballance of *Europe* wou'd be greatly endanger'd, which 'tis our chief interest to support? If so, I heartily congratulate with them their new magnanimous Resolutions, which they may soon have an occasion to exert, the Treaty of Partition being now quite out of Doors; and the
Ballance

But his reasoning, that the Danger we are now in is a Consequence of the Treaty, which compell'd the King of Spain to make a Will in favour of France. Now granting this to be true, I appeal to any reasonable Man, whether he ought from thence to infer, that we shou'd sit still and suffer France quietly to reap the Fruit of its perfidiousness. Does not Experience teach us, that Measures concerted with the greatest Prudence, at least with the best Intentions, do often fail of Success? Or shall the Falshood of our Enemies, which has defeated the end of a well-meant Treaty, furnish us with an Argument to neglect our own Safety? I hope no English-man will reason so extravagantly, nor be so blind as to revenge upon himself and his Country a suppos'd Mismanagement of the Court; were it not far better, if on all sides waving an invidious retrospection of past Miscarriages, we consulted with as much Unanimity, as our common Danger requires, what Measures are to be taken for our future Security.

That we are in the greatest Danger of losing our Trade, our Liberty, and our Religion, will hardly be denied by any Man who will seriously reflect on the Consequences likely to attend the present Union of *France* and *Spain*; unless he can suppose the French King's Ambition satiated with this great Success; and that as his Power to do mischief shall encrease, his Ill Will to us, and his Hatred to our Religion, shall be lessened. Or will it be said to remove our Fears, that he shall have no influence on the Spanish Counsels; that the Interest of *France* and *Spain* will remain distinct; and that the new King, forgetting his Country, his Obligations to his Grandfather, nay, and his own Interest, (for Kings and their People may sometimes have different Interests) shall become a perfect *Spaniard*, and cultivate the old Alliances of his Crown? Will the Examples of the Dukes of *Burgundy* formerly, and

and of the Dukes of *Holstein*, who prov'd the most bitter Enemies to the Houses of *France* and *Leopold*, of which they were descended, be alledged as Proofs that Brothers and Kinsmen, when Princes, do not agree better than mere Strangers. This Argument I own may be of force to prove, that hereafter the French and Spanish Branches of the House of *Bourbon*, if they continue separated, may have Quarrels and Bloody Wars. Nay, 'tis very likely that the Descendants of the Duke of *Burgundy* (if he have any) may after their Grandfather's Example protest against the Validity of his Renuntiation to the Duke of *Anjou*: But 'tis our Misfortune that Ten Years good Argeement between the Grandfather and Grandson may do our business, and that the differences which may fall out afterwards between the two branches of the House of *Bourbon* will come too late to retrieve our lost Religion and Liberty.

It behooves us therefore chiefly to take care for the present, and to consider whether it be not most likely that Nature and Education, back'd with the strongest Ties imaginable of Gratitude to a Grandfather, who has not stuck
 n. at violating two most solemn Treatys *, and hazarding a
 of War, which may prove the Ruine of his own Country;
 on. and to a Father, who has renounc'd his own Right to aggrandize this new King, will not encline him to have the utmost Deference for his Benefactors. Or shou'd we suppose him so very a King as not to be acted by any Principles of Nature or Gratitude, we must believe him also very blind to his own Interest, if he does not see that he will for a considerable time stand in need of his Grandfather's Aid and Protection, to secure both himself and his new Dominion against Foreign Enemies, and those intestine Disturbances which generally attend changes of Governments in all Countries. The fear of the French Arms induc'd the late King's Council to dictate a Will in favour of a French-man, and has compell'd the *Spaniards* to acquiesce in it, and so consequently gives to the D. of *Anjou's* Title
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all the Strength it has : Let that Fear be once remov'd, and 'twill be impossible for him to defend *Millan* and *Flanders* against the Emperour, or even the Body of *Spain*, in the Condition 'tis now, against the *Portuguese*.

Which makes it evident, that he cannot depart from the Protection of *France*, without pulling on himself manifest Ruine. And the Continuation of that Protection he will certainly enjoy no longer, than while he deserves it, by the most absolute Compliance with the Directions he shall receive from thence. If he prove an undutiful Child and be refractory, will it not furnish the *Dauphin* with a Pretence to assert his own Title, and invade *Spain* with the whole Power of *France*? While the Emperor endeavours to lop off some Limb.

Would he not besides cut himself off from all Hopes of succeeding to the Crown of *France*, the prospect of which is not so remote, as not to deserve his Consideration. The Duke of *Burgundy* has no Children, and 'tis generally thought in *France* that he will have none; till he have a Son, I am sure 'tis the present King of *Spain*'s Interest to be a French-man, and most Dutiful to his Grandfather and Father, especially since Kings are allow'd to have a Power of disposing of their Crowns by Will; and consequently, that upon any Disgust given his Parents, his Younger Brother the Duke of *Berry* might be declar'd Heir to the Crown of *France* to his Prejudice, as he has been to that of *Spain* to his Fathers and Elder Brother's.

It would be a Wrong offer'd to the Judgment of any Impartial Reader, if I should further insist on this Argument, which but too plainly at first sight evinces the truth of what I would assert, to wit, That the Duke of *Anjou* will enjoy a Kingship for some time purely Titular, and be in effect no more than a Crown'd Viceroy to his Grandfather.

Yet if any Man require a stronger Proof of what I here advance, I send him to the French King for Conviction :

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His Preference of the Will to the Treaty of Partition resolves the Question. For since 'tis well known that the strongest Lust of Old Tyrants is to extend their Despotick Empire, and that notwithstanding he has disdain'd to accept of Kingdoms, which, by adhering to the Treaty, he might have annex'd to his Crown, can we suppose that he had less Prospect in view, than at present to govern the whole Monarchy of *Spain*? And of taking such Measures as shall hereafter annex that Empire to his own; or at least the most considerable Members of it?

Now if it be granted, that he has obtained that End, as it must necessarily be if *England*, by acquiescing to the Will abandons her Allies, and suffers the new Domination of *France* to take Root; let us impartially consider whether after such an Accession of Power to a Prince, already too formidable, the Loss of our Religion, Liberty and Trade (as I have already said) does not seem inevitable.

That it is the Interest and Desire of the French to destroy both the *Dutch* and us, will easily be allow'd, since 'tis we who for a long time have check'd their Pride, and disappointed their Ambitious Designs. Our Maritime Power is terrible to them, nor will they readily forget the Affront receiv'd at *la'Hogue*, besides that Kings Affectation to be the Champion of Popery, and his Usage of our Protestant Brethren in his Dominions, tell us sufficiently what we are to expect from him.

The same superstitious Principles will not fail to make the *Spaniards* concur cheerfully with any Measures he shall propose to ruine our Trade, which, being the great Source of our Wealth, is consequently the greatest Support of the Protestant Religion, so much abhorred by them. And what Opportunities they have of doing it, is but too obvious to any Man that knows what a vast Coast they possess in both Worlds; to say nothing of the *Streights*-mouth, which, with the help of a French Fleet, they command absolutely.

Nor is there any thing to hinder the *French* from monopolizing

nopolizing the Wool of *Spain*, which wou'd at once destroy our Fine Drapery, which perhaps is the only considerable Manufacture in which we have no dangerous Rival. What Proportion this Part of it bears to the whole, I cannot determine; but certainly it is very considerable, since besides the vast Quantities of it exported to *Turkey* and *Persia*, we vent considerably of it every year to *Hambourgh*, *Holland*, &c. whereas we shall then be oblig'd to supply our selves with it from *France* for our own Consumption.

Besides, can we doubt that whenever the *French* shall desire it, the *Spaniards* will clog our Trade to *Spain* with such exorbitant Duties, and give us such other Trouble and Vexations, that we shall be oblig'd to quit that gainful Commerce, which will be engross'd by *France*, where all the Money that comes from *America* will then Center, in return for the Linnen and Woollen Manufactures, it will be able to supply their *Indies* and *Spain* withal. What if besides these Advantages, all the *French* Subjects shall be Naturaliz'd *Spaniards*; and as such, have liberty to Trade freely from *France* to the *West-Indies*? Is it not evident, That this single Priviledge will enable them to under-sell us? Though we shou'd be allow'd to Trade on our old Foot to *Cadiz*; and that consequently 'twill carry all the Treasure of the New World to *France*? Or can we promise our selves the continuance of that most beneficial Trade carry'd on of late Years by Connivance from *Jamaica*, directly to the Continent of their *America*? Can we, I say, promise our selves any Indulgences of that kind from the Frenchify'd *Spaniards*, who will be Governours in all their Ports?

I might dwell much longer on this Subject, but after what has been hinted, I appeal to any reasonable Man, whether 'twill not be in the Power of the *French* King to impoverish us more by a Ten Years Peace; as things now stand, than 'tis probable a War of the same continuance wou'd do.

When this Mischief is felt, 'twill be in vain for us to repent our mistaken Measures, in having preferr'd an ignominious and destructive Peace; to a War which might have been made with Advantage, Safety, and Glory. And if we shall then attempt a War against an Enemy, whose Wealth will be encreas'd in the same, or a greater Proportion than both ours, and the *Dutch* will be lessen'd, 'twill be too late, since we shall be destitute of those Allies we first deserted, and shall have suffer'd such a Diminution of our Power at Home, that 'twill then be madness to provoke an Enemy so much above our Strength. But there is no fear of our being guilty of such Rashness; we shall then have learn'd humbler Thoughts, and think our selves happy, if that invincible Monarch will allow us peaceably to enjoy the Product of our own Island. But even that will in all probability be deny'd us, and the continuance of that Inglorious Peace, which many are now so fond of, must be purchas'd at the expence of our Religion and Liberty,

The Abdicated Prince will be impos'd upon us, and if we are stubborn, we shall be us'd as Traytors to God, and our lawful King.

That the *French* King will attempt to Re-establish that Family will easily be agreed to, if we consider, that nothing can be imagin'd so agreeable to his Interest, his Resentment, his Ambition, and his blind Zeal for Popery. To his Interest, by humbling a free and powerful State, the Liberty and flourishing Condition of which must be great Eye-sores to a Tyrant who wou'd have all People as miserable as his own Subjects, that they may more easily endure their Slavery, to his Resentment, and Interest, by revenging himself upon those who have proy'd the main Obstacle to his long-courted Universal Monarchy, and who, till they shall be humbled, will continue to be so. His Ambition, 'tis well known, was never since his Reign, so foyled, as by his forc'd Compliance to own our present

sent King, after a Ten Years War to support King *James*, whose Interest he had so often publicly declar'd that he wou'd never abandon. And 'tis now the common Discourse in *France*, that nothing is wanting to compleat the Glory of *Lewis* the Great, and to raise his Name above *Charlemaign's*, but the Re-establishment of the King of *England*.

When therefore to these Considerations we add, that Instigations will not be wanting from *Rome* to prosecute so Pious and Religious a Work as the Reduction of *England* to the Catholick Faith (for that wise Court will not only find its Interest by our Conversion, but will secure the Peace of *Italy*, which is its great Aim, by procuring such a Diversion of the *French* Arms) when (I say) we consider all these Matters seriously, we must be very Scepticks, if we can doubt that such a Design will be set on Foot as soon as there shall be a Prospect of its being carried on Successfully; that is, so soon as we, by acknowledging the New King of *Spain*, and by refusing to assist the Emperor in his just Pretensions to that Monarchy, shall have forc'd both him and the *Dutch* to make the best Terms with *France* for themselves, which, in their forsaken Condition, they can obtain. From that Day will cease the Confidence so necessary to be kept up between us and our old Confederates, and we shall stand upon our single Bottom, expos'd to the joynt Attempts of *France*, *Spain*, and *Flanders*; nay, perhaps of *Holland* too, if we, by deserting them, at this time shall either expose them to be Conquer'd, or drive them to a necessity of securing themselves from that Ruin, by throwing themselves into the Protection of *France*. I ask any reasonable Man whether it is probable that in such a Condition we can be thought able to withstand their joynt Attempts, divided as we are at Home, and not so secure of the Affections of *Scotland* and *Ireland*, as were to be wish'd.

So that in our present Case, I do not take the Question to be, Whether we shall have War or Peace? but, whether

ther we shall with a good Grace, begin a just and honourable War, with the Assistance of powerful Allies, or by declining it shamefully at present, be forc'd in a short time, for our own Defence, to make it with the utmost Disadvantage? Every honest *English* Man will readily answer this Question when so stated, and conclude for War.

If it be Objected, That the Question is not fairly stated, one of these three things must be urg'd against the foregoing Argument; either that *France* and *Spain* will not Attack us, nor endeavour to Re-establish King *James* and Popery.

Or Secondly, That if they should joyntly attempt it, *England* alone wou'd be able to defend it self against them.

Or Lastly, That though they shou'd attack us, we shall find Confederates able and willing to assist us.

As to the first Objection, viz. That *France* and *Spain* will not attempt us, I think enough has already been said to prove, that it is the Interest and Desire of *France*; it remains therefore only to consider, whether it be not most probable that *Spain* will concur to an Undertaking so Meritorious, according to the bigotted Principles of that People, whose blind Zeal will on such an occasion be rous'd, and animated by all their Priests, and other Emisseries of the Court of *Rome*. Besides, let any Man reasonably shew how their present King and Ministry can deny to *France* this, or much more, if requir'd. It is by *France*, as we have already observed, That the Duke of *Anjou* must Reign, his Ministry be supported, and their Monarchy be protected, all which will make their Dependance so Absolute upon that Crown, that they dare refuse nothing; but 'tis needless by Argument, to confirm Matter of Fact, they have already out-run our very Fears and Jealousies, nay, even the Desires and Hopes of the French King, who has not at this time in *France* Vassals more servily devoted to him, than the *Spanish* Council has shewn it self to be by its late precipitate Measures.

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The *Spaniards* will moreover, by so doing, satisfy their Resentment conceiv'd against us, for having presum'd to divide their Monarchy; for with what *Disdain* and *Indignation* they received the Treaty of Partition, is apparent from the Measures they have taken to elude the Effect of it, since to preserve their Monarchy entire, they have receiv'd a King from *France*, and thrown themselves into the Protection of the Hereditary Enemy of their Monarchy and Nation.

I pass now to consider the Second Objection, which I heartily wish could be made good, *viz.* That *England* alone will be able to defend it self against the united Force of *France*, *Spain*, &c.

I have as honourable an Opinion of my Country as any Man, and do truly believe, that if by an absolute Composure of our Intestine Jealousies and Divisions, these Nations, were put in a Condition to exert their full Strength, they might give work enough to whatever Power shou'd dare to invade them. But since such an Union and mutual Confidence is rather to be wished for, than be depended on, and since we are wrangling and disputing in whose Hands 'tis safest to trust our Arms; and are only agreed in this, to have neither a Standing Force, nor a well-regulated Militia, we can hardly be thought to be in a good Posture of Defence. I would not here be mistaken, or thought to be arguing for a Standing Army; on the contrary I know, that in many ancient Governments, the whole Body of the People was so Trained and Disciplined, as to answer all the ends of the best disciplined Army; and 'twere to be wish'd, that the People of *England* had Vertue enough to put themselves on the like Foot, and that our Nobility and Gentry, remitting something of their present Ease, and slothful Luxury, would vouchsafe first to be taught themselves Martial Discipline, and afterwards with a generous Emulation would instruct others. If such a Spirit were once seen amongst them, the
People

People would readily follow their Example, and it would in a little time be thought no Hardship, nor any way inconsistent with the Liberty of the Subject, if every Man were obliged to spend two or three Years in his Youth in qualifying himself to defend his Country; the Sword being thus in the Hands of the People, could never be employed to their Disadvantage, and the Nation would be secure from all Foreign Attempts, since no Enemy would prove so adventurous as to attack so populous a Country as *England*, where every Man would be a Soldier. But till some such Method be taken, I do not think 'tis reflecting upon my Country to say, That we should be hardly put to it to defend our selves by our present Militia, against so formidable an Enemy as we shall have to deal with. I ask then, if any prudent Man would chuse to hazard all that is dear to him upon dubious Events, when 'tis in our Power by a timely Resolution to prevent our Enemies, and make their Countries the Seat of a War, which might otherwise be brought into *England*.

Or granting that we should, upon such an Emergency, defend our selves with so much Unanimity, Valor, and good Fortune, as to repel their first Assault, what will become of us when our Trade is lost? Or will our Fleets avail us ought, when all the Ports betwixt *Ostend* and *Sicily* shall be shut against them? (For 'tis certain that in such a Conjunction, neither *Portugal*, nor the little *Italian* Princes, will dare to receive our Fleets) when every Ship that would pass the *Streights* must either fight its way or pay Toll, and when our *West-India* Navigations will be rendred extreamly dangerous by the number of Men of War and Privateers, which our Enemies will be able to maintain along the vast Continent they are Masters of in *America*; when, I say, the Sinews of War will be cut off by such a Diminution, if not a total Loss of our Trade, must not our Maritime Power fall of Course? And our Island by consequence grow every Day more Defenceless,
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and expos'd to fresh Attempts? Let us then look about and see what Assistance we shall find abroad in our Distress?

This leads me to the Third Objection I propos'd to consider, *viz.* That tho' *England* shall acknowledge the new K. of *Spain*, and refuse to assist the *Emperor* in his Pretensions to that Crown, we shall notwithstanding find Confederates to assist us, whenever *France* and *Spain* shall endeavour to force King *James* and Popery upon us: the contrary of which I fear will be too easie to be proved.

War being in it self an Evil, and no ways desirable for its own Sake, 'twill easily be granted, that no wise State or considerate Prince will engage in it, but with a prospect of shunning some greater Evil, or of gaining some Advantage so considerable, as to compensate for the Mischiefs which necessarily attend it. If therefore we consider, first, what advantages the *Emperor* proposes by this War; then who will probably be his Allies in it, and what Motives will induce them to assist him: and that it be shewn afterwards, that our Refusal to joyn with them will defeat all the Hopes of the Success they aim at, it will, I think, follow naturally, that none of them will hereafter be over-forward to undertake for us what we shall now refuse to do for them, especially if the Assistance we may hereafter desire of them will no way answer the End they now propose, but on the contrary will expose them to far greater Hazards than we shou'd now risque by coming into their Assistance.

To begin then, The *Emperor* hopes by a War, with the assistance of his Confederates, to get the Monarchy of *Spain* for one of his Sons, a Prize certainly worth contending for. He hopes in this Pretention, to have for Allies, all those who were Guarantees of the *Pyrenean* Treaty, that is most of the Princes and States in *Europe*; and if the Reasons which gave a Foundation to that Treaty, and particularly to that Article of it, where *Lewis XIV.* and his Queen did renounce to all future Pretensions upon the *Spanish* Dominions, if, I say, the same Reasons specify'd in that Treaty, do still subsist, (which will hardly be deny'd) the *Emperor* seems with Justice, to demand of the Guarantees, that they will make good their Engagements. But because Treaties of late are found to be a

very weak Security, let us consider what particular Interests are likely to engage many Potentates to assist him.

First then, 'tis probable the whole Body of the Empire will assist him powerfully, since besides the Reasons common to them, and to other Powers, as their being Guarantees of the *Pyrenean-Treaty*, and the general Interest to keep the Ballance even, if possible, between the two great Houses; the Emperor has a claim to *Milan*, which it concerns them to assert, it being a Fief of the Empire, and by consequence upon default of Heirs Male, it must return to the Empire, without the consent of which it cannot be alienated; insomuch, that though even the Arch-Duke had been call'd to the Crown of *Spain*, by the late King's Will, he cou'd not have enjoy'd *Milan* without a new Investiture from the Emperor. And such is the Constitution of the Empire, that every Prince and State is oblig'd to assert their own with the Emperor's Right in this Case. The great Security of each of them, consisting in the Obligation they are all under to defend each part of the Empire, and to suffer no Alienation from it, but by their own Consent. And whoever should oppose in a Dyet their joynt Endeavours to assert that Right, may be put to the Bann of the Empire, and be deprived of his Estates. Examples of which some of our Royal Family transplanted there, may furnish us with. Some Princes of *Germany* are yet under stricter Engagements to the Emperor, as the King of *Prussia*, and Elector of *Hannover*, who in return for their new Dignities have obliged themselves to furnish on this occasion considerably more than their Quota's. The Circle of the *Lower Rhine* is highly concern'd to keep the French out of *Flanders*, since the Countys of *Liege*, *Cologne*, *Ments*, *Trevers*, *Julier*, and *Cleves*, would be extreemly expos'd by such a Neighbourhood, there being all the Reason to apprehend, that the *French King* would thereby be tempted to endeavour at making the *Rhine* the Boundary of *France*, as it was of ancient *Gaul*. And if we take a view of the whole Empire, we cannot doubt but 'twill act in concert, since all the great Powers of it are known to be absolutely in the Emperor's Interest, and shou'd any petty Princes have a mind to gainsay, a Majority in the Diet concludes them.

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The Emperor has great Reason to hope, that three other Potent Nations will assist him vigorously, for their own Sakes, their Honor as well as Safety evidently requiring it: All three have been treated by *France* with so much Indignity, their present Circumstances are so much alike, and the danger with which they are otherwise very nearly threatn'd, is so much the same, that I shall not part them, as I wish they may not separate from each other at this critical Juncture.

It will easily be understood by what has been said, that I mean *England*, *Portugal*, and *Holland*; over the two last the King of *Spain* pretends a Right of Sovereignty, as the King of *France* keeps at *St. Germain's* some, who have the like Pretensions upon us. The Trade of all three becomes by this Junction equally precarious; or, if there be any Difference, 'tis to the Disadvantage of *Holland*, since the *French*, who are now become their Neighbours in *Flanders*, may with great Ease open the Navigation of the *Scheld*, and restore the Commerce of *Antwerp* to its ancient Lustre, to the utter Ruine of the *Dutch*.

Holland and *Portugal* in one respect seem indeed to be more expos'd to their Enemies than we, since they are upon the same Continent with them; whereas our Azure Rampart keeps them at a greater Distance; so that all the Reasons urged to make *England* apprehensive of this Union ought more strongly to influence them.

If any Man shall object, that the Conformity of Religion is a Security to the *Portuguese* against the *Castilians*, let him consider what an inbred Hatred there is, and has been for some Ages, between those Nations, and how much the Indignation of the latter will be increas'd against a People, deem'd their Vassals, for their presumption in having concurred with us to dismember their Monarchy, and he may then change his Opinion. It seems therefore indispensably to be the Interest of these three Nations to assist the Emperor in dethroning the Duke of *Anjou*, since they have no other means to secure the Independency of their Governments. The *English* and *Dutch* are yet more nearly concern'd, since upon their Refusal the loss of their Religion, (which ought principally to be consider'd) must follow that of their Liberty.

Whether the Northern Crowns will be engaged in this Quarrel, or contribute any thing more than their Quota's, as Princes of the Empire, is uncertain. The Young Swedish Hero has his Hands full already; but 'tis not impossible that he may soon make a glorious end of his own War, and then come or send to our Aid, in return for the good Office we lately did him; this we may be sure of, that we shall not have both those Crowns either for or against us.

The Duke of *Savoy* we must believe to be very uneasy, and 'tis probable that he desires nothing more than such an opportunity to declare against *France*, as will not expose him to manifest Ruine, which wou'd certainly be the Consequence of his declaring for the Emperor, before there be a Power in *Italy* to support him. But, if the least favourable Success of the League shou'd ever open him a Door to come into it, we cannot think him so blind as to stand out, for the following Reasons, first, because 'tis his Interest, that there shou'd be a Power in *Italy* to protect him against such ill usage for the future as his Ancestors and himself have heretofore frequently received from *France*, which at present there is not, the *Milanese* being now full of French Troops.

Secondly, The *French* being already possessed of those Countries near him, which are to be fought for, and being not of a temper to part with any thing till they are forced to it, 'tis not probable that they will give him any share of their new Acquisition; whereas the *Emperor*, who is not yet possessed of any thing in *Italy*, and whose Interest it is to engage that Duke, will easily be brought to make him considerable Offers, and to bestow a great part of the *Milanese* on him, if the War, he is about making, prove successful.

The other Powers of *Italy* will probably be neutral, and do all they can to avoid taking any side, till they are forced to it by the strongest Party.

The *Switzers* also will be Lookers-on, and sell Troops to all Buyers; and the most that can be expected from their Zeal to the Publick Interest even amongst the Protestant Cantons, is, that they shall sell their Troops Five per Cent. cheaper to us than to *France*.

Having

Having thus taken a short View of the great Powers in *Europe*, and considered which of them will probably be induced to espouse the *Emperor's* Quarrel, and what will be their Motives for so doing, to proceed in my Argument I am to shew, that without the Assistance of *England*, the *Emperour* and his other Confederates will not be able to compass the end they propose.

That End I take to be the dispossessing the Duke of *Anjou* of the whole Spanish Monarchy; or at least of *Spain*, the *West-Indies*, and *Flanders*, and placing the Arch-Duke in his room. That a War ought not to be undertaken with any less prospect, is evident from this Reason, *viz.* That nothing less than such a success can answer the Main Prospect of the Confederates; for so long as the *French* shall rule in *Spain*, which necessarily carries along with it the Dominion of *America*, can *England*, *Holland*, and *Portugal*, (but *Portugal* chiefly) think their Liberties secure, and their Trade not merely precarious? Or so long as the *French* shall remain in *Flanders*, will not *England*, and *Holland*, and all the Princes bordering on the *Rhine*, think themselves in the greatest Danger? The Commons of *England* certainly reasoned thus, in King *Charles* the II.'s time, when so many Addresses were presented by them: And the many Millions given by them in this Reign for the same purpose, do sufficiently justify this Opinion.

† The *Emperor* and his Partizans will, I believe, carry the thing further, and say; That so long as the *French* shall have *Naples*, *Sicily*, and *Milan*, the Ballance will be too much on their side, even tho' an *Austrian* Prince were possessed of *Spain*, *Flanders*, and the *West-Indies*.

Supposing then that the Design of the Confederates is by a War to dispossess the new *French* King of *Spain*, it is asked, Whether, without the Aid of *England*, 'tis probable they can succeed in that Undertaking? To which question, I am confident, that all who are against a War will readily answer, No: and probably ask whether, with the Assistance of *England*, 'tis an Undertaking possible to be compassed. That question I mean to consider in another Place; and since 'tis sufficient for my present purpose to have it agreed to, that without

us they will in vain undertake such an enterprize, I will, with my Adversaries, take it too for granted, and from thence conclude, That since our Refusal to joyn with them, will defeat all the hopes of the Success they aim at, it follows naturally, that none of them will hereafter be forward to undertake for us, if we stand in need of their Help, what we shall now refuse to do for them.

But because it may be objected against my Conclusion, that Resentment and Passion ought not to influence the Councils of wise Governments, that particular Piques are ever sacrificed to the Interest of State, and that therefore the Powers above-named, finding it to be their Interest, may be induced to assist us hereafter in our Distress, notwithstanding the Dissatisfaction which our present Desertion of them may occasion.

To remove the force of this Objection, let us particularly examine what Powers 'tis reasonable for us to expect will engage in our Defence. Will the *Emperor* turn Champion for the Protestant Religion and the Liberty of a People, who will have so highly disobliged him? When his hope of preserving the Spanish Monarchy in his Family by our Assistance, will be for ever defeated; which Hope was the main Reason that has kept him our Ally so long. Is it not more reasonable to apprehend, that the Pope may mediate an Accommodation between him and *France*, by intermarrying, or procuring to him perhaps some Province, which is more than he can ever, by his own Force, wrest from *France*, if he shou'd obstinately make War by himself. On the contrary, such a War wou'd Ruine him, and disable him from assisting us ever, if he shou'd have the Will to do it.

Can any Protestant, without Horror, reflect on the fatal Consequences which wou'd attend such an Accommodation. I shall not, for brevety's sake, repeat any thing on that Subject, which several Pamphlets have already taken notice of, but proceed to examin from what other Allies we may hope for Assistance.

As for the Protestant Princes of *Germany*, 'tis not sure that they will preserve themselves free; or if they do, is it probable that they can give *France* such a Diversion as wou'd be necessary

necessary to save us? Especially when such an Alliance wou'd furnish the Emperor with a Pretence to forward so Holy a Work, as the Destruction of Heresie; towards which Design 'tis most probable that his Zeal and Ambition will then direct him, when his other great Hopes are vanish'd.

The Northern Crowns are too remote, and too poor, to give any timely or effectual Aid.

'Tis highly probable, that the *Hollanders* will be able to preserve their Government no other way, than by throwing themselves into the Protection of *France*; and in this Case their whole Power by Sea will be always ready to act against us at the Will of *France*; and their Situation will besides cut us off from all Communication with *Germany*. But if any one can suppose, that they will be able to preserve their Government upon easier Terms, it must be so precariously, that they will not dare to give the least Jealousie to their watchful Neighbour by coming to our Relief.

From these Considerations 'tis, I think, evident, that if ever we want Help, we shall not find Allies able or willing to defend us. But it has been proved in the foregoing part of this Discourse, from the Consideration of the Interest, Will, and Power of our Enemies to attack us, and from our Inability to defend our selves, that we shall stand in need of Assistance; therefore the Conclusion is too plain, We shall be a Prey to our Enemies.

Having thus, from Principles, which to me seem undeniable, shewn what will be the necessary Consequences of a Peace, *viz.* The utter Ruine and Destruction of our Trade, Liberty and Religion: I would proceed next to offer some Thoughts concerning a War, but that I have lately heard of an Expedient propos'd by some to save all, without the Hazard or Expence of it. The rank of the Persons, I heard quoted for it, and the Approbation which I found it met with from some, who pass for Men of good Understandings, induce me to offer it to the Consideration of my Reader. But I do before-hand beg his Pardon, if after having thus rais'd his Expectation, he shall judge it to be the Mountain's Birth. 'Tis propos'd then, for our Security against the Dangers we apprehend, That a Treaty shall

shall be made with *France* and *Spain*, wherein it shall be expressly stipulated, That neither of those Crowns shall make any Innovation, or give the least Disturbance to our Trade. On the contrary, 'tis said that *France* is so desirous to preserve the Peace of *Europe*, that rather than Disoblige us, 'tis to be hoped they will condescend to make new Treaties of Commerce with us more to our Advantage than those which now subsist. It shall be moreover especially provided, that no Attacks shall be made on the *Hollanders*, who for, their greater Security, shall be allow'd to maintain Garrisons in some of the strong Towns of *Flanders*, which, being in Dutch Hands, will be so many Pledges of the punctual execution of whatever shall be agreed on; and to inforce the more the religious Observation of such a Treaty, we are to put our selves in a posture of defending our selves against any breach thereof, which our Enemies might offer.

Now, of such who propose this noble Expedient, I will crave leave to ask one Question, that is, Who shall be Guarantee of such a Treaty? It must either be God or Man. But if the *French* would have accepted of God Almighty for Guarantee of their Treaties, or be bound by the Reverence which, even Heathens, payed to Oaths, they durst never have broke the *Pyrenean* Treaty, which perhaps was the most solemnly and religiously covenanted of any that History mentions. From their Violation of that, and I believe, we may truly say, of all those ever made by their present King, 'tis manifest, that the French exclude God Almighty from being Guarantee of their Treaties.

If Man shall be Guarantee of such a Treaty, I demand who this Man, or Men, shall be? Will the Emperor be one? But by the very state of the Question, we are supposed to have deserted him and his Interest, and to have left him to shift for himself the best he can: Without him, is there a Power in *Europe* sufficient to give the Law to *France* and *Spain* united? Or granting there be, shall we be sure that all the Princes, who must compose such a Guarantee, will, on a sudden, reconcile their different Interests; and engage themselves in a War to make it good, purely for the sake of two Nations, who will have set them a Pattern to slight such Engagements, by having so readily acquiesced in the Notorious Indignity lately put upon them. Is it not therefore evident, that such a Treaty will only expose us to the Division of our Enemies? Who having thus clinched the first Trick put upon us, by a worse, will have reason to make Sport of our fond Credulity.

As to putting our selves in a Posture of Defence, it can only mean, Increasing our Forces by Sea and Land; that is, putting our selves to near the same Expence which would defray a War, to do nothing.

To evince more fully the Insufficiency of any such Project, and to shew, on the Contrary, how subservient it wou'd prove to the Designs of those who mean to introduce Popery and Slavery, I will beg leave to make on Supposition, which, for the better Information of my Reader, and for Arguments sake, I hope I may be allowed to do.

Let us suppose then, that *France*, ever watchful, and ready to promote it's Interest in Foreign Countries, should have thought it advisable to entertain Emissaries among us, whose Business it should be not only to send over faithful Advices of all that passes here, but likewise by the Credit they should endeavour to gain with People of several Ranks, to prepare the way for King *James*; and supposing that some Englishmen, either corrupted with French Money, or acted by mistaken Principles of Zeal and Loyalty, to what they call the Right Line, should prove Base or Blind enough to undertake such a part: how ought we reasonably to imagine that such Men wou'd Act and Speak? Do we not believe, that in all their Conversations they wou'd cry up the Advantages of Peace? Wou'd they not display their Eloquence in setting forth the deplorable State of the Nation, already exhausted by the great Taxes of the last War, and made thereby unable to contribute towards the Expences of a new one? Would not the peaceable Disposition of the King of *France*, shewn by his Willingness to Purchase the Peace of *Reswick* at a very dear rate, furnish them with specious Arguments to prove, that we have nothing to fear from an old Prince, abandoned to the Counsels of an older Woman? If these, or the like Arguments failed of Success; wou'd they not endeavour to beget in People a Diffidence of his Majesty, by insinuating, That we know not what Secret Practices have been manag'd between him and *France*? Or how far both Kings are agreed to Inslave all *Europe*? That a Sham War is necessary to blind Folks, and to get a Standing Army, which is still the Bottom of this whole Design.

Such Chimera's, whispered with a seeming Concern for the Liberty and Good of *England*, might deceive the Unthinking. But if any such Emissaries, as I have supposed, shou'd have

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had so much Art and Dexterity as to get Access to his Majesties Person and Councils, how is it probable they wou'd then direct their Batteries?

If they had not to do with a Prince, whose great Wisdom makes him as incapable of mistaking his own and his Peoples Interest, as his high Spirit makes it impossible that he shou'd ever condescend to any Measures that might lessen that Glorious Character he is so justly in Possession of, they wou'd certainly advise such a Treaty with *France*, and boldly press, to have the Duke of *Anjou* owned King of *Spain* immediately. Their Advice might be enforced by creating a Diffidence of the Parliaments readiness to vindicate the Honour of his Majesty, and to provide for the common Security. Which Diffidence might be founded on this false ground, That because the Commons of *England* wou'd not in time of Peace keep up Standing Armies, nor over-look the many Abuses put upon his Majesty by hungry Courtiers, who wanted not Stomachs to Swallow all the Estates of *Ireland*, if their Rapine had been tolerated; it shou'd therefore follow, that the same Commons wou'd not take greater Care to prevent King *James's* making Grants of all the Estates in *England*: Or that the same Zeal which moved them to take such wise Precautions, to prevent our own Kings from bringing in *Slavery* upon us, by standing Armies, wou'd not warmly inspire them with such Vigorous Resolutions, as may disappoint our Enemies, who wou'd force it upon us from Abroad.

If by such Misrepresentations of English Parliaments, a Jealousie of them could once be raised, more Troops, and a Treaty with *France*, were a ready Salvo; nor wou'd there be wanting Presidents in our own History to back their Advice.

But His Majesty's Sublime Genius being such as would certainly awe the most impudent and corrupt Councillors from proposing such wicked and shallow Measures, and which proved so fatal to his Predecessor, let us consider what other Mischiefs their surreptitious Favour might enable them to compass. Why? We may be sure they wou'd affect Popularity, by talking against Taxes, and arguing against the necessity of a War, which wou'd have this good Effect; That the

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Multitude judging of the Situation of Affairs by the Countenances of those who were at the Helm, and finding all about Court serene and unconcerned, wou'd conclude, they were in no Danger; which mistake they might be confirmed in by the unshaken and steady Temper of his Majesty, whose Magnanimity so often tryed in great Adversities might, by the Unthinking, on this Occasion, be misconstru'd as a certain Symptom of Security: Whereas, it seems to import extremely at this juncture, that People be made thoroughly acquainted with their Danger, lest by some hasty and precipitate Resolutions, they put it out of their Power to provide against it.

The same Emissaries wou'd undoubtedly obstruct, as much as in them lay, any Offers made by his Majesty, or his Parliament, at Repairing, if possible, the Great Loss this Nation has made by the Death of his Royal Highness the Duke of Gloucester, since the Protestant Successor, that shou'd be appointed, might prove a Rub in the way of the Frenchify'd Family; besides, that the Concurrence which his Present Majesty shou'd give to such a Provision for the Settlement of our Religion and Liberty upon a firm Basis, wou'd intirely secure to him the Affections of his People, and destroy the false and malicious Insinuations they and their Partisans wou'd suggest; as if his Majesty had no farther Concern for our Safety, than during his own Life; the contrary which is so manifest, by the Great Things he has already done for us, that it argues an incurable Perverseness to turn otherwise. For shou'd Men deny this Truth, our Record will transmit down to Posterity, with a Multitude of wholesome Laws, and Constitutions, the Memory of this illustrious Hero, who never thought it beneath his Kingly Dignity to gratify the just Desires of his People, even by the diminution of his own Prerogative.

But such is the Levity of Mankind, that Groundless Suggestions are often received as clear Proofs; and should the Pensioners above-mention'd prove so industrious and successful, to get the Places of greatest Trust filled with Men, who thought their Rightful Master were beyond Sea, wh

nice Consciences cou'd never be reconcil'd to His Present Majesty's Title, and who were known Enemies to those Popular Principles which gave a Birth and Foundation to our present Government, and by which alone it can, for the future, be supported.

Would not such unexpected Measures seem to authorise very extravagant Jealousies, and might they not startle Men the best affected, by making them apprehensive, that some such Bargain were driving on, as our Histories give us an Example of in King *Stephen*? Would not the fearful Prudence of many Rich men incline them in such a Case, to make their private Peace, and to be reconciled to those who might become our Masters, (for there are not wanting Examples of Men, who even, during a War, have made Private Treaties of Peace with the Enemies of their Country) and would not the Multitude, judging it self abandoned by those from whom it expected Protection, be prepared without Opposition to wait for a new Revolution.

If it be true, That Men paid from *France*, and directed from *St. Germans*, would use such, or the like Artifices, to bring about their wicked purposes, it is certainly incumbent on an English Parliament, by taking opposite Measures, to leave no room for such practices.

Our Enemies desire to see such men amongst us advanced to Places of Trust and Dignity as are Enemies to his Majesty's Person, and to that Liberty he has so wonderfully cur'd to us. Since therefore the High State of Kings makes it difficult, if not impossible, for them, to be thoroughly acquainted with the principles of all those who have the Honour to approach their Persons, if ever it should happen that any such, with mischievous Intentions, should insolently intrude themselves into Posts of the greatest Trust, do's not seem consistent with the Allegiance and Zeal a Parliament ought to have for their Prince, in the most humble manner to lay before him, the Danger his Person and Government might be exposed to by a misplaced Confidence.

The Enemies of our Religion and Liberty wish, that we should be as careless in providing for the Succession of *England*,

as our late Allies the *Spaniards* were for theirs. Such an Omission would furnish our Good Ally the King of *France* with a fair Opportunity of shewing us as great Marks of his Friendship, as he has done to *Spain*, by supplying us in time of need with a King of his own breeding up. What though he should exact of us to pay the Charges of his Education, and send us in a Bill for the expence he has been at in attempting to restore him sooner ; Can we in Gratitude do less than satisfy so just Demands ? And tho' we should not have Ready Money enough to pay immediately so just a Debt, would it not be reasonable to give our obliging Friend, the King of *France*, Cautionary Towns for a Security, till it were punctually discharged ; and to Postpone, upon such a Consideration, all the Publick Debts, contracted in Defence of an Usurpation ? Will an English Parliament leave the least Door open to such Mischiefs ? Sure it will not, but rather take Warning from the Example of a Neighbouring Nation, and take Care that Count *Tallard* be not made a Duke for Services of the same Nature in *England*, with those of the Duke *D' Harcourt's* in *Spain*.

If some Provision be not made at their next Session, will not our Enemies both at Home and abroad, look upon such an Omission as a tacite Indication, that the Nation is prepared to receive a Prince that shall be nameless ? And wou'd not such a Delay prove by so much of more fatal Consequence to us, than the King of *Spain's* Will did to that Country, as that our Religion runs the greatest of hazards by such a Turn.

I know there are some who wou'd be thought Protestants and Freemen, who fondly flatter themselves, that a Boy Banish'd by *England* almost as soon as Born ; who with his Milk sucked in Popery, and an Aversion to *England*, which have been strongly Inculcated into him till the Age of Thirteen by two most Zealous, Stubborn and Revengeful Parents, will forget that his Great Grand-Mother and his Grand-Father had their Heads Cut off by the People of *England*. That the same People have twice Forced his Father into Exile, Deposed him, and Reduced himself with both his Parents to Beg their Bread in a Foreign Country ; That I say, forgetting all This, and laying aside all thoughts of Promoting the

the same Religion, and the same sort of Government he has been taught in *France*, he will prove a Defender of the Protestant Faith and the Liberties of *England*.

Men so Infatuated God only can restore to their right Senses, by restoring him they wish for, unless the Sins of this Nation should so far provoke Divine Vengeance as to bring such a Revolution upon us. I despair these Men can ever be perswaded of the necessity we are under to entail the Crown of *England* upon Protestants.

But least any man of Principles quite opposite, shou'd be made a Tool to them, and Joyn with them in opposing the Settlement of our Succession, I beg leave to address my self to such as imagine, that when our present Settlement is run out, a Common-Wealth may be set up, and are therefore against enlarging it. Their hopes I conceive to be ill founded for the following Reasons.

First, Because there is a great Majority against them throughout the People of *England*, nine in ten of which are for sticking to the Ancient Constitution.

Secondly, Because there are not Ten Commonwealths men in *England* agreed upon any Scheme or Plan of Government, for which reason 'tis impossible they shou'd ever Act with so much steadiness and unanimity as wou'd be requisite. This truth is manifestly confirmed by the experience of that variety of Governments which were set up Successively after *Cromwell's* death; and which all ended in bringing in King *Charles* the Second of pious Memory.

Thirdly, Because their Adversaries wou'd Act in concert, being united under one Head; and whatever may be Objected against Monarchy when settled, 'tis certainly, in turbulent Times, the Government most likely to prevail.

Fourthly, If by a Common-wealth they mean a free Government, and wou'd be satisf'd with the thing, tho' it want the Name of Republick, 'tis far more probable to attain that end by Settling the Succession, than by any other way; since it may be done with such Limitations as will abundantly secure our Freedom. 'Tis therefore to be hoped that the present Parliament will take this Matter in-

to their serious Consideration, and by complying with the earnest wishes of all honest men who expect it, defeat the Artifices of our most dangerous Domestick Foes.

Our Enemies wish the King may be disabled, from resenting the most Insolent Affront put upon him, and that he may authorize their unparallel'd Perfidiousness, by acknowledging the Duke of *Anjou*, hoping that such a Condescension, may lessen that Reputation of Valour and Wisdom, which has for so many Years, proved the greatest Obstacle to their vast Designs.

Is it not therefore to be hoped, that an English Parliament, will have a tender regard for the Honour of a Prince whose Reputation has hitherto stood us in such stead ? for if so many Princes of different Religions and Interest, as were Confederated in the last War, Armed in our Defence, and by a perseverance scarce to be Parallel'd in any History, remained in firm Union for Ten years ; must it not be own'd that his Majesty's great Genius, first gave motion, and afterwards directed all the springs of the complicated Machine ? Shall not then the great Council of our Nation when their Advice is Asked on this important affair, dissuade his Majesty, from making a Step, which, by lessening his Character, will lessen his Power to do us good.

If I shou'd say that it nearly concerns the Honour of *England*, as well as the King's, to resent the King of *France* Violation of the Treaty of Partition I know 'twou'd disoblige some Gentlemen, who are of a contrary Opinion because, say they, the People of *England* had no hand making it. But of such I will ask, Whether, tho' it has been ratified by the Parliament, the King of *France* would have had greater regard to it ? If not, and that *France* could not reasonably conclude, but that it wou'd meet with general approbation, which ought certainly to be supposed till the Legislative Power had declared otherwise ; it is evident, she has offered the highest Affront to the Nation, as well as to his Majesty.

If it be Objected, That it wou'd be of very evil Consequence, that the Nation should be obliged to make good,

the expence of English Blood and Treasure, all such Treaties as future Kings may make, to the disadvantage of *England*; and that therefore we are to be no farther concluded by them, than our Parliaments shall judge them to be, for the Honour and Advantage of the Publick. I Answer, That no Nation we shall treat with, will for the same Reason, think it self bound by any thing stipulated with us, since whenever they shall be pressed to execute any Treaty, which they shall think to their disadvantage, they may with truth object, that Obligations, to be of force, ought to be mutual; whereas they can have no security of a Compliance on our side, since 'twill be in the Power of a Parliament, to disable our King from performing his part of the Covenant.

If it be from hence Inferred, That all Treaties made between Us and other Nations signify just nothing, it belongs to our Legislators to consider whether this be one of the many Defects in our Constitution, which 'tis their Province to remedy; some Provision against such cases for the future, is certainly more consistent with their Wisdom at this Dangerous conjuncture, than unseasonable Cavils against the Prerogative of a Prince who has already done so much to better our Constitution; that 'twill visibly be no Fault of His, if under His Reign it be not brought to the greatest Perfection 'tis capable of being Improved to.

Our Enemies by a Peace desire to secure themselves in an undisturbed Possession of their ill gotten Acquisitions, and building upon our Complaisance, and perhaps upon Assurances given them from some *English Portocarrero's* are already forming Projects to rest from Us our Religion and Liberty. And we, good natur'd People, shall let the World see that *Spain* is not the only Country where *French Money* and Artifices have prevail'd over the National Interest. Will not the Parliament rather Advise and Enable His Majesty Once more to take upon him the Glorious task of Rescuing *Europe* from Bondage, and setting Bounds to the insatiable Ambition of *France*.

How much such an Enterprize, if it succeed, will redound to the Glory, Profit and Security of *England* is needless to

mention. It remains therefore only to consider what means we have to effect it; that is what Forces our Confederates and we can bring to bear against *France*, and what she can probably oppose to us.

To begin with *England*, 'twill be allowed that if she think fit to Engage in a War, she can and will maintain a Naval Force; which, with the assistance of *Holland* will be Superior to that of our Enemies in the Ocean, the *Mediterranean* and in *America*. The Advantages which such a Mastery at Sea, well managed, may give us, are too many to be Enumerated. That Eight or Ten Thousand Land-men on Board our Fleet, may frequently be of very great use, is likewise undeniable, 150000 *l.* a Year added to the present Establishment of our Guards and Garrisons will enable us to spare such a Force.

We are assured that the Emperor, before Spring, will have encreased the Troops he has on Foot, which now exceed 70000 Men, to Ninety Six Thousand, of which Seventy Thousand will be employed offensively against *France*, and in *Italy*. The remainder with the Militia's of his Hereditary Countries being a Force more than sufficient to guard his Frontiers. And we are likewise assured that a Fund for the maintenance of them is actually Settled.

The Empire cannot be supposed to act with less than Sixty Thousand Men, if we consider how many great Princes of it are under strict engagements to the Emperor; and that others, as the Elector *Palatine* with all his Ecclesiastical Brothers are most nearly concerned to remove the French from being their Neighbours in the Spanish Netherlands. The King of *Prussia* and the House of *Lunenburg* alone are known to keep in Pay near Fifty Thousand Men. It will therefore easily be allowed me, that if the whole Empire will exert its utmost strength, it may bring into the Field a far greater Number, and there is no doubt but upon any Emergency it will. But I wou'd be now understood to speak only of such a Force as will be constantly kept on the Enemies Frontiers ready for Action, besides the Garrisons which every Prince will be careful to provide for his own Security.

The Dutch have had on Foot ever since the Peace, Forty Thousand men, old Troops, which by filling up their Regiments as they were in time of War, will in six weeks time make Sixty Thousand as good men and as well Officer'd as any *France* can oppose to them. If that Number be not thought sufficient for their Defence, it is reasonable that *England* shou'd assist them with a Body of Twelve Thousand men at least, or Money to pay such a Body; or by encreasing our own Naval Force and taking upon us a greater share of the War by Sea, than was done last War, ease them of so considerable an expence as may be Equivalent to such or a greater number of Troops, which by that means they may be enabled to pay.

Thus we have already Reckoned up above 200000 Men against which *France*, if it mean to have any Success, must have at least as many to Oppose. For we have not found, during the last War, that she ever Boasted of any Advantage got over the Confederacy with Inferiour numbers.

If besides these, The King of *Portugal* be Assisted by the Confederacy, and that to the 20000 Men, which at least he is Allow'd to have, on Foot, Fifteen Thousand, either *Germans*, *English* or *Dutch* (tho' possibly Popish Troops wou'd be most Acceptable in that Country) be Added and Commanded by the Arch-Duke in Person, whom with such an Army it must be our care to Transport thither; let Us consider how *Spain* will be Able to Oppose the Impression such a Force wou'd make.

He that wou'd from a just Estimate of the Power and Wealth of *Spain* at this time, need only to consider that *Ceuta* has been Beseiged near Ten Years by not above Five or Six Thousand Rascally Moors. 'Tis true, some times there has been a greater Force before it, but the greatest part of the time, the Besiegers have not exceeded that Number. And, to Defend that Place, *Spain* did within these Four or Five Years desire the Assistance of *Portugal*, which sent some Companies thither, but they soon returned home half Starved for want of the Pay they had been Promised.

Or if we will look back to *Barcelona*, we shall find a Town of that importance, taken without ever having been Besieged; for it never was so, properly speaking, the French Army being not numerous enough to invest it, nor to hinder succours and refreshments of all kinds, or so much as the Post from going in and out every day; notwithstanding which, and that the Garrison as well as Townsmen defended it, with great Valour; it was forced to surrender, because all *Spain* was not in a condition to supply one single Town, with a sufficient Garrison. And I am now credibly inform'd, that excepting the German Body under the Prince of *Hess*, there are not Six Thousand Men in all their Country, in a condition to March.

But 'twill be said, they may raise Men and have an Army of their own, before you can have transported the Force designed for *Portugal*. To which I shall only reply, That Men are not to be Raised without Money, and how much their Government wants that, is evident, by the difficulties they have been at, to raise a sufficient Summ, for the reception of their New King; notwithstanding their utmost effort on such an occasion, we are told, that the greatest part of his Spanish Family stayed at *Madrid* for want of it, and that those who did go to meet him, made a Journey at their own expence.

Nor let any man believe, that their New King, had he the Wisdom of his Grandfather, can so soon reform that unhinged Government, as to make it contribute any thing considerable to its own defence, especially if a War be carried into the Bowels of it immediately. For 'tis certain, that *Spain* has submitted to this change, purely for fear of a War, which it is in no condition to make. If therefore it find, that instead of Quiet and Ease, which was the end it proposed, it has drawn on it self, a more severe War than *France* could have made, is it not to be hoped, that the people will soon be very weary of their New King? That when the Arch Duke, a Prince of the Family they have been so long governed by, shall appear among them, he will have a number of Friends? For 'tis hardly to be imagined,

that the house of *Austria*, which has reigned there near 200 Years, should so suddainly have lost all its interest in that Nation, as to have no Friends left, if they durst declare and had a head to resort to. If we consider the natural Antipathy, the people of *Spain* have to the French, this will appear more probable. And indeed, all things considered, it is not easy to imagine, that *France* has any Friends there, except a Court Cabal. The multitude tricked and betray'd by Courtiers, and finding no assistance or protection at hand, cou'd do no less than submit patiently. But if such an Army as is proposed, were ready to give countenance to the Male-contents, 'tis not to be doubted but that the Arch Duke wou'd soon be saluted King, and the French party either driven out of *Spain*, immediately, or be oblig'd to maintain a great Army to oppose the Confederates, who wou'd be daily strengthened by *Spaniards* joyning them, and in all probability, wou'd be able to beat the French out at last.

Those who know how Expensive the last War in *Italy* proved to the French King, and that the small Army he there Maintained against the Duke of *Savoy* cost him more than his vast Armies of *Flanders*, will easily perceive that if he be obliged to carry the War to the Frontiers of *Portugal*, it must prove much more ruinous to him, since from his own Frontiers thither is a March of above 500 Miles over many Mountains as rugged as the *Alps*, and through a Country barren and dispeopled, and where such a Force as he must bring, cannot subsist without Convoys from *France*.

If therefore he will send an Army of Force sufficient to keep the Field against that of the Confederates, which I suppose to be of above 30000 men, he must have besides his Army in the Field near half that number dispersed at convenient distances to secure the March of his Convoys and Ammunition, which for the greatest part of so long a tract must be carried on Mules-backs over Mountainous and narrow Passes, where the very Peasants may Intercept and Plunder whatever is not strongly Guarded.

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How prodigious an expence such a War must draw upon him, the most unexperienced Reader will readily judge, and I believe I may with great modesty affirm that Forty Five Thousand men which I suppose him obliged to maintain there, will cost him as much as three times that number in *Flanders*. If to this we add that the whole Coast of *Spain* will lie exposed to the insults of our Fleet, that we may perhaps take *Cadiz* by the assistance of our Confederate Army in *Portugal*, and to put all *Andalusia*, the richest Province in *Spain* under Contribution, it seems reasonable to believe that *Spain*, to be delivered from such Mischiefs, will side with the Confederates to drive out the *French*, who will not probably behave themselves towards the *Spaniards*, so as to lessen the natural aversion they have for each other.

If to what has been said, it be Objected that the King of *Portugal* has Acknowledged the Duke of *Anjou*, and that therefore he will not Joyn with us.

I Answer, That till he cou'd be Secure, that *England* and *Holland*, who alone can assist him Effectually against *Spain* and *France*, wou'd Engage heartily in such a War, 'twas the most advisable course he cou'd take to court an Enemy he cou'd not singly deal with. But we cannot believe but that a Prince, who passes in the World to have Courage, must be highly provoked by the Slurr lately put upon him by the French, who having omitted no Arts to Engage him to be a Guarantee of the Treaty of Partition and promised him *Badajos* and *Alcantara*, two Spanish Towns on his Frontiers, have thus Basely tricked him. The interest he has besides to secure his Crown to his Descendents is an Invincible Argument for him to oppose the present Union of *France* and *Spain*.

For as high a conceit as the *Portuguese* have of their own Valor, they cannot be so Extravagant as to think themselves an equal Match to *Spain*, when it shall be Governed by a Wise and Active Prince backed with the Fleets and Armies of *France*. The ease with which *Philip* the Second Conquered them, and the Assistance they stood

stood in need of from *France* and *England* to support their last defection from *Spain*, tho' *Spain* was then Engaged in a War with *France*, and that *Catalonia* was revolted at the same time, make it Evident that their great Security consists in having for their Neighbour a King of *Spain*, who shall always have such a Jealousy of *France* as may divert him from the Thoughts of reducing *Portugal*, and against whom they may be sure to be Assisted by *France* if he shou'd attempt it. Which whether they are to expect hereafter, it behoves them to Consider now.

But is it not far more Probable that the King of *France*, whom we may certainly conclude resolved never to part with *Flanders*, will propose the Conquest of *Portugal* for an Equivalent to the Spaniards ; such an Expedient will seem Agreeable to the Interests, and Inclinations of both those Crowns. For *France* has for some Ages looked upon *Flanders* as a Province dismembred from its Patrimony, as it really was by the Dukes of *Burgundy*, and has been long Aiming to reunite it. And as for *Portugal* its Situation, Contiguous to the Body of *Spain* makes it of greater Consequence to that Nation, than a Province so remote and Exposed as *Flanders*. Besides, they will be pleased with the Thoughts of humbling by the help of *France*, those Proud Vassals they have ever Hated, even more than their Dutch Heretick Rebels. Their having lately added *Portugal* to the Title of their new King, contrary to what was Practised by his Predecessors, and the Arms of *Portugal* having been in some Scutcheons lately quartered with those of the other Kingdoms of *Spain*, do sufficiently tell the Portuguese how the Spaniards are inclined to them.

These considerations seem then, to put it out of dispute, that the Portuguese will not Miss such an opportunity as now presents it self of Securing, by our Assistance, their future independency, by placing on the Throne of *Spain*, a Prince who will be so highly Obligated to them for such a Service, that he will never have any desire to hurt them ; or who, shou'd he prove Ungrateful, will not have it in his Power, since *France* will ever be ready to hinder such an

an Increase of Dominion as *Portugal* wou'd be to the Arch-Duke should he become King of *Spain*.

Taking it therefore for granted, that the Powers above named can, and will, bring such a force as has been mention'd, to bear against our Enemy, let us consider how able he will be to furnish out so many Land Armies, and provide at the same time for the defence of a Coast, several Thousands of Miles in extent. To make as near as may be a true estimate of his Wealth and Power ; I shall give my Reader an account he may depend upon, of some particulars relating to his Revenues, and the number of his Forces at different times.

His whole Revenue did in the year 1666, amount to 126 Millions of Livers, which reduced to English Money, according as the Exchange went then; that is reckoning Thirteen Livers to the Pound Sterling, wou'd make Nine Millions and about Six Hundred Thousand Pounds ; it produced the Two last Years only One Hundred and Seven Millions, which reduced to English Money according as the Exchange has gone for that time, *viz.* at Fifteen Livers to the Pound Sterling, (which difference of the Exchange, has been occasion'd by the raising the Standard of his Coin) make about 7140000*l.* by which computation 'tis evident, they are sunk above Two Millions Four Hundred Thousand Pounds Sterling, that is at least one Fourth part of what they were at the time before mention'd ; which plainly shews that the People and Wealth of *France*, are decreased since that time, at least in the same proportion, since we may reasonably conclude, that the King's Revenues have been managed as carefully, and Collected as Rigorously in his late times of need, as they were heretofore.

The King's income is diminished in a far greater proportion, it being clogged with a Debt of Five Hundred Millions only to the *Hopell de ville*, or Town House of *Paris*, for which he Pays Interest at Five *per cent*, Twenty Five Millions, that is near 1700000*l.* Sterling. He pays besides another sort of Interest, by way of Salleries, for a Multitude of new Offices Erected and Bought, many of them
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since the beginning of the last War, which amounts at least, to so much as will make the Interest Money already mention'd, exceed Two Millions Sterling; so that he has coming in clear not full Five Millions Sterling.

'Tis farther observable that since the Peace he has not paid one Shilling of the Capital, but instead thereof has taken up more Money, which indeed has not Increased the Interest he pays (unless it may be what he has Borrowed these last Twelve or Eighteen months) because he reduced the Interest payed to all those, who lent their Money during his most pressing Exigences at Six, Seven and Eight *per Cent* to Five, which Defalcation he has appropriated to Pay the Interest of what he has since Borrowed. 'Tis true he has Suppressed some of the erected New Offices which were most Burdensome to the People. But how? Why? It being Unreasonable, that such as had Assisted him with Money during the War, shou'd be losers, he has Graciously condescended to allow that such Provinces or Towns as were most Grieved by these Offices, shou'd repay to the Persons possessed of them their Principal purchase Money.

Before I say any more on this head, I will mention a Word about his Land Forces, which for some time during the War, are said to have exceeded 300000 Men, besides those on board his Fleet. But since the last Reduction made about the Latter end of the Year 99, they were brought to be barely one Hundred and Twenty Thousand Men, and so continued till the King of *Spain's* Death, just before which Orders were issued for an Augmentation to be made against *January* last which was to have Increased them to a 156000 and which is not yet fully Perfected.

I know 'tis generally thought he was much Stronger, but Lists of all the Regiments are to be had with ease, which, if regard be had to the Reductions made at several times, will be found to agree Perfectly with the Account I give. Yet notwithstanding so great a Reduction of his Forces, which ought to have Lessened his Expence, 'tis most certainly known, that the very last Year his Expence exceeded his Income one Million Sterling.

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'Tis true that, besides his Ordinary Revenue, he has had Extraordinary ways of raising Money; as the Sale of Offices already Mentioned, frequently Raising and Falling the Standard of his Money *Dons gratuits* which people are made to pay *per Force*, Registring Titles of Gentility, Taxing Partizans, that is those who have had the managing of his Revenues, who were last Year forced to refund near a Million Sterling, and many other Expedients, which in time we may be better Acquainted with, if we are pleased to let him go on quietly, but these have all been so often made use of, that they will be found to be of very small Resource for the future, in a Country so much exhausted by them already.

What has stood him in greatest stead for some Years, during the last War, was the Capitation, which brought him in above three Millions Sterling Yearly, and which he must again have recourse to: but how grievous an Imposition that was thought, and how Ruinous it must prove to his Country, if he shou'd be under a Necessity of Continuing it but a few Years, I appeal to any who have been there, and Heard the Heavy complaints it occasioned. But a stronger proof can not be required to shew how Destructive the Continuance of it wou'd have Proved, than that the King took it off. For his most Christian Majesty has generally been observed to lay as great a load on his People as they cou'd bear. Since then he was pleased to ease them of this Tax when he wanted not so Specious a Pretence to continue it as the great Debts he had Contracted, we may be sure he knew it cou'd not be done without utterly ruining, and disabling them to pay at all.

Having thus briefly touched upon the present Condition of *France*, and having a little before shewn that *France*, if it will make a Successful War, will, besides the Necessary Garrisons of his Sea-ports, be obliged to Maintain two Hundred Forty Seven Thousand men. *viz.* Sixty Thousand against the Forces of the Empire, Forty Thousand against that part of the Emperours Troops which will Act on the

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Rhine,

Rhine, Seventy two Thousand against the Dutch, Thirty Thousand against the Emperors Army in *Italy*, and 45000 in *Spain*. If besides attention be made to what has been said Concerning the Prodigious expence of his last Italian War, which he must again renew, and to the reasons there are to believe that the War he must make in *Spain* will be liable to the same, and greater Inconveniences, since the Seat of War will be three times at least more remote from his Frontiers than *Piedmont* was. Will not the greatest *Partizan* of *France* own, that here is work Enough cut out for that Great Monarch, who must Immediately raise or Hire, at least 100000 Men, and Equip out a prodigious Fleet? Or if he will decline the Expence of Naval Armies, he must Considerably reinforce all his Sea-port Garrisons, and have a very great Number of men to Guard his Coasts.

Then if it be true that his ordinary Revenue fell short one Million Sterling of Maintaining the Ordinary Expences of his Government, and of 120000 men, must not that Million be made good, and must not near 200000 Land men more besides his Fleet, and the other Necessary expences of a War be defrayed out of the Capitation, and out of such Money as he must Borrow? But out of the Capitation, supposing that it may again raise Three Millions there can be Applied, but two Millions towards these vast Extraordinaries, which if by a modest Computation we shall reckon at Six Million Sterling, It is evident that he must every Year contract a new Debt of Four Millions Sterling, besides a Growing Interest, which added to his already Immense Debt, must in a few Years absorb the greatest part of his Revenue in Interest.

'Twill, I know, be objected, that the last War has shewn his Power to be matchless, that he then maintain'd 400000 Men by Sea and Land, why therefore may he not do the same again? why? For that very Reason, because a Man who has but a 1000 *l.* per *Ann.* has for Ten Years together spent 2000 *l.* Yearly, do's it therefore follow, that he may do so Ten Years longer? States in this resemble private men, that if they for a considerable time expend more than

than 'tis possible for their Subjects to furnish Yearly, they may, nay must, inevitably be Ruined. And that a State may become Bankrupt, *Spain* sufficiently witnesses, which had once a Fund of Wealth thought Inexhaustible, and without comparison greater than that of *France*.

If I should in the sequel of this discourse, propose our paying Five Millions Yearly towards a War, and our Maintaining Eighty Thousand English or Foreign Troops abroad, because we did so during the last War, the Weakness of such an Argument wou'd be obvious, and I shou'd with justice be Answered, that we have thereby contracted a considerable Debt, which every honest Englishman ought to desire to see Pay'd off, rather than Encreased. And yet the parallel will not fully hold between *England* and *France*. Because *England* never has been, and I hope never will be scrued up like *France*, to pay to the utmost extremity of what it is able, and for that reason might comparatively with ease, get rid of a far greater Debt than it now owes; Whereas *France*, unless it shall by our Inactivity get the *West-Indies*, will never be able to pay its Principal Debt, but daily Increase it to its utter Ruine, if we neglect not this favourable opportunity of pressing her, before the Monarchy of *Spain*, which is at present a Burthen to Her, be so modelled, as to make their United Power Irresistible.

From what has been said I leave it to my reader to draw conclusions, being unwilling to forestall his Judgment, concerning the Success of a War carry'd on in the manner proposed. His own Sagacity cannot but Suggest to him many reflections to the Advantage of *England*, which are naturally deducible from the foregoing discourse. I shall therefore hasten to the conclusion of it, and only take notice of the most material objections which can be made against a War. *viz.*

Either the necessary expence 'twill draw on us, or the prejudice we may sustain by the Interruption of our Trade.

To the First, I Answer, that in the manner it has been proposed, that *England* shall make a War, we may do it at an Annual expence, at most of One Million Eight Hundred and Fifty Thousand Pounds, more then wou'd otherwise be Levied. For we will take it for granted, that tho' we remain in Peace, we should find it necessary, to maintain at least as great a Sea Force, as was done the First Year after the Peace, that wou'd cost us Eight Hundred Thousand Pounds, to which if we shall add one Million two Hundred Thousand Pounds, for the War, 'twill abundantly strengthen our Fleet; especally if we Consider that out of the Forces now on Foot in the three Kingdoms, Eight or Ten Thousand men may be kept on Board it, which will save the Expence of near such a number of Seamen. The Aid proposed to be given the Dutch whether in Men or Money, or in taking upon us a greater Proportion of the War by Sea, will come within 200000 *l.* The addition proposed to our Forces in the Three Kingdoms to fill up Regiments to a Necessary Complement may be Limited to a 150000 *l.* And if besides all this it be thought Requisite to Furnish 300000 *l.* Yearly to enable the King of *Portugal* and Arch-Duke to Press our Enemies on their weak side, this whole Additional expence will amount to 1850000 *l.* which whether *England* be not better able to bear than it has been shewn that *France* can, the Necessary annual Extraordinaries of 6600000 *l.* Sterling, which such a War must force it to Levy, let the most partial Frenchman determine.

I will not then suppose that any English Man will think the Preservation of his Religion and Liberty too dearly Purchased at that rate. Such an undervaluing of those Blessings none can be capable of, whose hearts are not hardened and who are not doomed to utter Perdition. But that cannot be thought of a People, whom the hand of God hath so lately rescued from the imminent danger they were in of losing both; nor can it be presumed that they will now so far tempt his Providence, as to neglect the opportunity he has visibly put into their hands; not only
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of securing, to themselves for ever those inestimable Blessings, but likewise of propagating his holy Gospel, by procuring ease to the many Persecuted Protestants both of *France* and *Germany*. For can the Emperor now refuse us any thing of that kind, which we shall think fit to Stipulate? and may we not promise our selves in a few Years, to have so far humbled *France* as will be necessary for so good an end? As to what may be Objected concerning Trade, I answer, That granting our Trade to the *Streights* should suffer an Interruption by the War, such an Inconvenience wou'd be far less than the Total Loss of it, not only thither, but to the *West-Indies*, besides the Loss of the Manufacture of our fine Drapery, which it has been proved, will be one of the necessary consequences of our sitting still.

Yet I can see no necessity of granting that our *Turky* and *Italian* Trades will suffer by the War, if we will suppose our maritime Affairs to be well managed. The War we are to make must be altogether by Sea, and consequently implies a necessity of our having every Summer a Strong Fleet in the Mediterranean to Harra's our Enemies there; why then our Traders thither may not be Protected by that same Force, I cannot see. And if strict Prohibitions be made against any Ships going thither, but under the Convoy of our Men of War at set Seasons; 'tis probable much fewer will be Lost than were during the last War. For the convenience of being sheltered in Spanish Ports, proved a Temptation then for many Merchant Ships to run without Convoy: whereas none will now be so Adventurous as to hazard a run to *Turky* or to *Italy* along so vast a Tract of an Enemies Coast. Our Trade to *Spain* it self, which I own to be very considerable, will indeed be at a stand till the success of our Confederate Armies and Fleets readmit us thither; but then a moderate strength well Managed in *America* will abundantly Compensate for that Loss.

Whoever

Whoever knows the weakness of the *Spaniards*, in those Parts, and remembers that *Pointi* with a handful of men took *Carthagena*, a well Fortified Town, and which had Five times the Number of men to defend it, that he had on Board his Ships, can not deny but there is a plentiful harvest for whoever can send a good Fleet to gather it. If we take care to have a Force in those Seas Superior to the *French*, our Plantations are so conveniently situated that not a Galleon coming or going can Escape us. How much such an Interruption of all Commerce thither, wou'd distress *Spain* is apparent, and it probably might be none of the weakest reasons to incline that people to side with us.

The Wealth we shall thereby acquire will not only defray the expence of the Force we shall Maintain there, but with good Managment, may go a great way towards the Charge of the whole War: and 'twill be the fault of our Commanders if all the French Colonies there be not rooted out, which for these Reasons we ought Chiefly to aim at. *1st*. It will greatly weaken the French power at Sea by destroying so great a Nursery of their Seamen *2^{ly}*. We shall lose a dangerous Rival in our Sugar Trade as well as some others, which they have common with us by means of their Colonies in the Southern Isles. *3^{ly}*. This will very much increase our Trade in *Africa*, for Negroes; and ruin that of the French. For every one knows that none can carry on a Trade for Negroes but such as have a footing in *America*. The Consequence therefore of our expelling the French, will be, that the Spaniards must depend absolutely upon us for their Negroes, without which their Mines will be Barren, besides that our Power being freed from such a Rivalship will be so much Superiour to any thing in those parts of the World, that the Spaniards can have no Ballance, nor Force there to Protect them against us: so that for fear of their Plate Fleets and of their very Empire in *America*, t'will be always in our Power to obtain greater Privileges from them in our Trade thither, than any

ny other Nation cou'd pretend to, for which reasons I submit it to every English man, whether it ought not to be one of our great Aims, by this War, utterly to extirpate the French out of *America*? such an undertaking will appear more feasible if we consider that matters may be so carried, as to deprive the French of any Assistance from the Spaniards, which I believe may be done by consenting to a Neutrality with all the Spanish Continent and Islands, on condition they shall, during the War, allow us a free Trade with them.

If such a Neutrality can be manag'd, we shall not only with greater ease destroy the French there, which ought to be our Principal aim, but probably be greater Gainers by a free Trade, than by the Plunder of their Country; if we make War upon it, it wou'd certainly prove more beneficial to the Trading Interest and Manufactures of *England*. For if by our Naval Power there, we hinder that vast Country from being supplied with any European Commodities, from any other hand, shall we not have a prodigious vent for all the Manufactures of our own Growth, as well as for our East India Commodities and Linen, &c.

May not the access we shall thus get to those people, introduce a vent for many of our Commodities which the Spaniards have always industriously kept from their knowledge? Shall we not likewise Trade to a far greater advantage than has been done hitherto, since we have always been obliged to trust the Spaniards at *Cadiz* who certainly shared the Profit with us? besides the Exorbitant Indulto's or Duties exacted by the Government both in *Europe* and *America*.

May we not thus during the War give a beginning to such a Commerce directly from our Plantation to the Spanish Continent, as may be continued after a Peace, to the unspeakable benefit of *England*? for when once the *Americans* will have discovered at how much more easy rates we can supply them than the Spaniards have done, Will they not for their own sakes Endeavour to continue it? and shall

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we not have reason to expect the Allowance of it, from the new King we shall have Seated on the Spanish Throne?

This Notion of a Neutrality may displease the *Buckaneers*, and perhaps our Sea Commanders, who wou'd find their account better by Plundering that rich Country. And it may perhaps be thought Ridiculous to suppose that the Governours of those Provinces, who will have strict Orders to do all they can to Extirpate us can ever be brought to consent to it. But to that I answer, that if we have a Power sufficient to Burn and Destroy their Country, 'tis much more Probable that the present Terror of our Arms, will prevail with that Wealthy but Defenceless people, than the Orders they shall Receive from the unsettled Government of *Spain*; and that they will much more willingly part with their Gold and Silver, in return for our Commodities, which 'tis in our Power to hinder them from being supply'd with any other way, than expose themselves to be plundered of their Riches and their Maritime Provinces, to utter Destruction.

We know that the French Fleets during the last War have frequently been Supplied with Refreshments of all kinds, from the Governours of several Maritime Towns of *Spain* it self, how much more likely is it then, that the remote Provinces we are speaking of, will, by a like compliance, endeavour to shun their utter Ruin? Especially when they will be in doubt of the Fate of their Mother Country: or to which of the Princes contending for the Empire of it, they will owe their Obedience: in such an uncertainty will not a weak and Rich Country, incline to such Measures as will bring Security and Profit? The Advantages that wou'd Accrue to us from such a Neutrality, appear to be so great, that we ought carefully to court them to it. And thoud that Method fail we shall still have it in our Power, to make them Repent their not Accepting of it, and by Harsher means to acquire an Immense Treasure.

F I N I S.

Postscript

Postscript.

SOME Addresses of the House of Commons, to King Charles the II. Relating to *Flanders*, have been mention'd in the foregoing Discourse. Since the Printing of which, we have News from *Paris*, that Orders are sent there to *Mareschall Boufflers*, not only to take possession of all the Spanish Netherlands, but to Disarm and Seize the *Dutch* Troops in Garrison there ; and we have reason to Fear, that those Orders are already Executed. It may therefore not be unseasonable to offer to the Publick, The very Addresses made to King Charles, with His Answers : By which it will appear what was the sense of *England* at that time, upon the Progress of the *French Arms* in those Provinces.

March the 6th. 1676. The House being Resolved into a Committee of the whole House, to consider of Grievances, Resolved,

That a Committee be appointed to prepare an Address, to Represent unto His Majesty the danger of the Power of France, and to desire His Majesty by such Alliances as His Majesty shall think fit, to secure His Kingdoms, and quiet the fears of His People, and for preservation and securing of the Spanish-Netherlands.

March the 10th. Mr. Powle Reported from the Committee the following Address, which was presented, read and agreed to, *Nemine Contradicente.*

May it please your Majesty,

WE Your Majesties most Loyal Subjects, the Knights, Citizens and Burgeses in Parliament Assembled, find our selves obliged in Duty and Faithfulness to Your Majesty, and in discharge of the Trust reposed in us, by those whom we represent, Most humbly to offer to Your Majesty's serious Consideration, that the Minds of Your Majesty's People are much disquieted, with the manifest danger arising to Your Majesty's Kingdoms by the Growth and Power of the French King ; especially by the Acquisitions already made, and the further Progress likely to be made by him in the Spanish-Netherlands, in the preservation and security

curity whereof, we Humbly conceive the Interest of your Majesty, and the Safety of Your People are highly concerned; and therefore we most Humbly beseech Your Majesty to take the same into Your Royal Care, and to strengthen Your Self with such stricter Alliances, as may secure Your Majesties Kingdoms, and preserve and secure the said Netherlands, and thereby quiet the Minds of Your Majesty's People.

Resolved,

That the Concurrence of the Lords be desir'd to the said Address; and that Mr. Powle do go up to the Lords to desire their Concurrence. And upon the 15th of March, the Lords sent word that they had agreed to the Address, and that his Majesty had appointed both Houses to attend him, to present their Address to morrow at Three of the Clock in the Afternoon, in the Banqueting House at White-Hall.

March the 16th. The Address was presented to his Majesty by both Houses. And March the 17th. Mr. Speaker reported to the House, that according to the Order and Command of the House, he had attended his Majesty in presenting the Address, and that the Lord Chancellor having introduced it with a short Preface and then read it; His Majesty was pleased to return his Answer to this effect.

My Lords and Gentlemen,

I Am of the Opinion of my Two Houses of Parliament, that the Conservation of Flanders is of great importance to England; and therefore I assure you, I will use all means for the preservation of Flanders, that can possibly consist with the Peace and Safety of the Kingdom.

March the 19th. A motion being made for a farther Address to his Majesty, to enter into a strict and speedy Alliance with the Confederates.

Resolved,

That the debate of this Motion be adjourned till Monday Morning next at ten of the Clock.

Monday March the 26th, The House then proceeded upon the debate of the Motion for a farther Address to his Majesty, to enter into a Speedy and Strict Alliance with the Confederates.

Resolved

resolved,
That a farther Address be made to his Majesty, giving him assurance that if (in pursuance of the Address, presented to his Majesty from both Houses) His Majesty shall find himself necessitated to enter into a War, This House will fully Aid his Majesty from time to time, and assist him in that War.

The 29th of March, The following Address was reported and agreed unto by the House.

May it please Your Majesty,

WE Your Majesty's most Loyal Subjects, the Knights, Citizens and Burgesses in Parliament Assembled, do with unspeakable Joy and Comfort, present our Humble Thanks to Your Majesty, for Your Majesty's Gracious acceptance of our late Address, and that Your Majesty was pleased in Your Princely Wisdom to express Your Concurrence and Opinion with Your Two Houses in reference to the Preservation of the Spanish-Netherlands. And we do with most earnest and repeated Desires, implore Your Majesty, That You would be pleased to take timely Care to prevent those Dangers that may arise to these Kingdoms by the great Power of the French King, and the Progress he daily makes in those Netherlands and other places. And therefore that Your Majesty would not defer the entering into such Alliances as may obtain those ends; and in case it shall happen that in pursuance of such Alliances, Your Majesty shall be engaged in a War with the French King, we do hold our selves Obligated, and do with all Humility and Chearfulness assure Your Majesty, That we Your most Loyal Subjects shall always be ready upon Your signification thereof in Parliament, fully, and from time to time, to assist Your Majesty with such Aids and Supplies, as, by the Divine Assistance, may enable Your Majesty to prosecute the same with success.

All which we do most Humbly offer to Your Majesty as the unanimous Sense and Desire of the whole Nation.

March 30. 1677.

IT was alledged against this Address, That to press the King to make further Alliances with the Confederates against the French King, was in effect to press him to a War; that being the direct and unavoidable Consequence thereof.

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That

That the consideration of War was most proper for the King, who had intelligence of Foreign Affairs, and knew the *Arcana Imperii*.

That it was a dangerous thing hastily to incite the King to a War.

That our Merchant-ships and Effects would be presently seized by the *French* King within his Dominions, and thereby he would acquire the value of, it may be, near a Million to enable him to maintain the War against us.

That he would fall upon our Plantations, and take, plunder and annoy them.

That he would send out abundance of Capers, and take and disturb all our Tradingg Ships in these Seas, and the *Mediterranean*.

That we had not so many Ships of War as he, and those Thirty which were to be built with the 600000*l.* now given, could not be finished in two years.

That we had not Naval Stores and Ammunition, &c. sufficient for such a purpose, and if we had, yet the season of the year was too far advanced to set out a considerable Fleet: and we could not now lay in Beef, Pork, &c.

That when we were engaged in a War, the *Dutch* would likely slip Collar, leave us in the War, and so gain to themselves the singular advantage of sole Trading in Peace, which is the privilege we now enjoy, and should not be weary of.

That it was next to impossible, to make Alliances with the several Parties as might be expected, such and so various were the several Interests and Cross-biasses, of and amongst the *Emperor*, the *Spaniard*, the *Dane*, the *Dutch*, the *Brandenburg*, and the several lesser Princes of *Germany*, and others.

That we may easily enter into War, but it would be hard to find the way out of it, and a long War would be destructive to us; for though the *Emperor*, *French*, *Spaniard*, &c. use to maintain War for many years, yet a Trading Nation, as *England* is, could not endure a long-winded War.

On the other side it was said;

That they did not Address for making War, but making Leagues, which might be a means to prevent War.

That the best way to preserve a Peace, was to be in a preparation for War.

That.

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That admitting a War should ensue thereupon, as was not unlikely, yet that would tend to our Peace and Safety in conclusion; for it must be agreed, that if the Power of *France* were not reduced; and brought to a more equal Ballance with its Neighbours, we must fight or submit first or last.

That it was commonly the Fate of those that kept themselves Neutral, when their Neighbours were at War, to become a Prey to the Conqueror.

That now or never was the critical Season to make War upon the *French*, whilst we may have so great Auxiliary conjunction; and if it were a dangerous and formidable thing to Encounter him now, how much more would it be so when this opportunity was lost, the Confederacy disbanded; a Peace made on the other side of the Water, and we left alone to withstand him single.

That as to his seizing our Merchants Effects, the Case was (the same, and) no other now than it would be three years hence, or at any time whensoever the War shall commence.

That as to our Plantations and our Traders, we must consider, though the *French* was Powerful, he was not Omnipotent, and we might as well defend them as the *Dutch* do theirs by Guards, Convoys, &c. and chiefly when the *French* have so many Enemies, and we shall have so many Friends, as no other time is like to afford.

That they were sorry to hear we had no Ships, Stores, &c. equal to the *French*, and to our Occasions, and hoped it would appear to be otherwise.

That the Season was not so far spent, but that a competent Fleet might be set out this Summer, and that however deficient we might be in this kind, the *Dutch* were forward and ready to make an effectual Supplement in that behalf.

That howsoever ill and false some Men might esteem the *Dutch*, yet Interest will not lie, and it is so much their Interest to confine and bring down the *French*, that it is not to be apprehended, but they will steadily adhere to every Friend and every Alliance they shall joyn with for that purpose.

That however cross and diverse the several Confederates and their Interests were, yet a common Alliance may be made with them against the *French*, and as well as they have Allied themselves together, as well may the Alliance be extended to another, to be added to them, viz. The King of England.

That

That a numerous and vigorous Conjunction against him is the way to shorten the Work, whereas, if he should hereafter attack us singly, he would continue the War on us as long as he pleased, till he pleased to make an end of it and us together, by our final destruction.

That if now we should neglect to make Alliances, we had no cause to expect to have one Friend, when the *French* should make Peace beyond Sea, and single us out for Conquest; for all that are conjoynd against the *French* are provoked and disobliged by reason of the great number of *English*, *Scotch*, and *Irish*, which have served, and do still serve the *French*, and it was proved at the Bar of this House within this fortnight, That 1000 Men were Levyed in *Scotland*, and sent to the *French* Service in *January* last, and some of them by force and pressing.

Also that it was understood and resented, that we had mainly contributed to this overgrown greatness of the *French*, by selling *Dunkirk*, that special Key and Inlet of *Flanders*, by making War on the *Dutch*, in 1665. Whereupon the *French* Joyned with the *Dutch*, under which shelter and opportunity the *French* King laid the Foundation of this great Fleet he now hath, buying then many great Ships of the *Dutch*, and building many others: as to which, but for that occasion, the *Dutch* would have denyed and hindred him, but not observing the Triple League, and by our making a Joint War with the *French* against the *Dutch*, in which the *French* yet proceeds and triumphs. So that in this respect we have much to redeem and retrieve.

That Enmity against the *French* was the thing wherein this divided Nation did unite, and this occasion was to be laid hold on, as an opportunity of moment amongst our selves.

That the bent and weight of the Nation did lean this way, and that was a strong Inducement and Argument to incline their Representatives.

That it had been made appear, and that in *Parliament*, that upon the Ballance of the *French* Trade, this Nation was determined yearly 900000*l.* or a Million, the value of the Goods imported from *France*, annually so much exceeding that of the Goods exported hence thither, whereby it is evident, that such a Sum of the Treasure and Mony of the Nation was yearly exhausted and carried into *France*, and all this by unnecessary Wine, Silks, Ribbons, Feathers, &c.
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The saving and retrenching of which Expence and Exhaustion, will in a great degree serve to maintain the Charge of a War.

That the present was the best time for the purpose, and that this would give Reputation to the Confederates, and Comfort and Courage to our best Friends immediately, and Safety to our Selves in Futurity against the *Old perpetual Enemy of England*.

The Second Address was presented to his Majesty, *March* the 30th. And no Answer return'd till *April* the 11th. In which Interval the News came of the *French* taking of *Valenciennes* and *St. Omers*, and the Defeat of the Prince of *Orange* at *Mont-Cassel*. Upon which this following Answer was offered to the Speaker from His Majesty by Mr. Secretary *Williamson*.

C. R.

HIS Majesty having considered your last Address, and finding some late alterations in Affairs abroad, thinks it necessary to put you in mind that the only way to prevent the Dangers which may arise to these Kingdoms, must be by putting his Majesty timely in a Condition to make such fitting Preparations as may Enable him to do what may be most for the Security of them. And if for this reason you shall desire to sit any longer time, His Majesty is content you may Adjourn now before Easter; and meet again suddenly after to ripen this matter, and to perfect some of the most necessary Bills now depending.

Given at our Court at *White-Hall* the 11th of *April*, 1677.

This occasioned a long Debate, and concluded in Voting the following Answer, which was presented to His Majesty by the Speaker and the whole House, on *Friday*, *April* 13. 1677.

May it please Your most Excellent Majesty,

WE Your Majesty's most Dutiful and Loyal Subjects, the Commons in this present Parliament Assembled, do with great Satisfaction of mind observe the regard Your Majesty is pleased to Express to our former Addresses, by Intimating to us the late alteration of Affairs abroad, and do return our most humble thanks for your Majesty's most gracious

gracious Offer made to us thereupon in your last Message: And having taken a serious Deliberation of the same, and of the Preparations Your Majesty hath therein Intimated to us were fitting to be made in Order to those publick ends, we have for the present provided a security in a Bill for an Additional Duty of Excise, upon which Your Majesty may raise the Sum of 200000 l. And if Your Majesty shall think fit to call us together again for this purpose, in some short time after Easter, by any publick signification of Your Majesty's pleasure, commanding our Attendance; we shall at our next meeting not only be ready to re-imburse Your Majesty what Sums of Money shall be expended upon such Extraordinary Preparations as shall be made in pursuance of our former Addresses; but shall likewise with most cheerful Hearts proceed both then, and at all other times to furnish Your Majesty with so large proportions of Assistance and Supplies upon this Occasion, as may give your Majesty and the whole World, an ample Testimony of our Loyalty and Affection to Your Majesty's Service, and as may enable Your Majesty by the help of Almighty God, to maintain such stricter Alliances as you shall have entred into against all opposition whatsoever.

This Address was presented April the 13th. And upon Easter Monday, April 16th, another Message in Writing from His Majesty, was delivered by Secretary Williamson to the House of Commons, (viz.)

C. R.

HIS Majesty having considered the Answer of this House to his last Message, about enabling him to make fitting Preparations for the Security of these Kingdoms, finds by it that they have only enabled him to borrow 200000 l. upon a Fund given him for other uses; His Majesty desires therefore this House should know, and he hopes they will always believe of him, that not only that Fund, but any other within his Power shall be engaged to the utmost for the Preservation of his Kingdoms; but as his Majesty's Condition is (which his Majesty doubts not but is as well known to this House as himself) he must tell them plainly, that without the Sum of Six hundred thousand pounds, or Credit for such a Sum, upon new Fonds, it will not be possible for him to Speak or Act those things which should answer the ends of their several Addresses, without exposing
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the Kingdom to much Greater Danger : His Majesty doth further acquaint you, that having done his part, and laid the true State of things before you, he will not be wanting to use the best means for the safety of his People, which his present condition is capable of.

Given at our Court at White-Hall, April 16. 1677.

Thereupon the House fell into present Consideration of an Answer, and in the first place, it was agreed to return great thanks to his Majesty for his Zeal for the safety of the Kingdom, and the hopes he had given them that he was convinced and satisfied, so as he would Speak and Act according to what they had desired, and they resolved to give him the utmost assurance, that they would stand by him, and said no Man could be unwilling to give a fourth or third part to save the residue. But they said they ought to consider that now they were a very thin House, many of their Members being gone home, and that upon such a Ground as they could not well blame them ; for it was upon a Presumption that the Parliament should rise before *Easter*, as had been intimated from his Majesty within this fortnight, and universally expected since : And it would be un-Parliamentary, and very ill taken by their Fellow-Members, if in this their Absence, they should steal the Priviledge of granting Money, and the Thanks which are given for it ; that this was a National Business if ever any were, and therefore fit to be handled in a full National Representative, and if it had hitherto seemed to go up hill, there was a greater cause to put the whole Shoulder to it, and this would be assuring, animating, and satisfactory to the whole Nation. But they said it was not their mind to give or suffer any delay, they would desire a Recess but for three Weeks or a Month at most.

And the 200000 *l.* which they had provided for present use, was as much as could be laid out in the mean time ; tho' his Majesty had 600000 *l.* more ready told upon the Table.

And therefore they thought it most reasonable and advisable, that his Majesty should suffer them to adjourn for such a time ; in the Interim of which his Majesty might, if he pleased, make use of the 200000 *l.* and might also compleat the desired Alliances, and give notice by Proclamation to all Members to attend at the time appointed.

The Answer is as followeth, and was read and agreed to the same day.

May it please your Majesty,

WE your Majesty's most Loyal Subjects, the Commons in this present Parliament Assembled, having considered your Majesty's last Message, and the gracious Expressions therein contained, for imploying your Majesty's whole Revenue at any time to raise money for the Preservation of your Majesty's Kingdoms; do find great cause to return our most Humble Thanks to Your Majesty for the same, and to desire Your Majesty to rest assured, that you shall find as much Duty and Affection in us, as can be expected from a most Loyal People to their most Gracious Sovereign. And whereas Your Majesty is pleased to signifie to us, that the Sum of 200000 l. is not sufficient without a further Supply, to enable Your Majesty to Speak and Act those things which are desired by your People; We humbly take leave to acquaint Your Majesty, that many of our Members (being upon an expectation of an Adjournment before Easter) are gone into their several Countries, we cannot think it Parliamentary in their Absence, to take upon us the granting of Money, but do therefore desire Your Majesty to be pleased that this House may Adjourn it self for such a short time, before the sum of 200000 l. can be expended, as Your Majesty shall think fit, and by Your Royal Proclamation to Command the Attendance of all our Members at the day of Meeting. By which time we hope Your Majesty may have so formed your Affairs and fixed your Alliances, in pursuance of our former Addresses, that Your Majesty may be graciously pleased to impart them to us in Parliament; and we no ways doubt but at our next Assembling, Your Majesty will not only meet with a Compliance in the Supply Your Majesty Desires, but withal, such farther Assistance as the posture of Your Majesty's Affairs should require. In Confidence whereof, we hope Your Majesty will be encouraged in the mean time to Speak and Act such things as Your Majesty shall judge necessary for attaining those great Ends, as we have formerly represented to Your Majesty.

Upon this the Parliament was Adjourned from April the 16th, to the 21st of May following: when they Met, and Adjourned till Wednesday May the 23d, at which time his Majesty sent a Message for the House to attend him presently at the Banqueting House in Whitehal, where he made the following Speech to them.

Gentlemen,

Gentlemen,

I Have sent for you hither, that I might prevent those Mistakes and Distrusts which I find some are ready to make, as if I had called you together only to get Money from you, for other uses than you would have it imploy'd. I do assure you, on the Word of a King, that you shall not repent any Trust you repose in me, for the safety of my Kingdoms; and I desire you to believe I would not break my Credit with you; but as I have already told you, that it will not be possible for me to Speak or ~~All~~ those things which should Answer the ends of your several Addresses, without exposing my Kingdoms to much greater dangers, so I Declare to you again, I will neither hazard my own Safety, nor yours, until I be in a better condition than I am able to put my Self, both to defend my Subjects and offend my Enemies:

I do further assure you, I have not lost one day since your last meeting, in doing all I could for your Defence; and I tell you plainly, it shall be your fault and not mine, if your Security be not sufficiently provided for.

The Commons returning to their House, and the Speech being Read, they resolved into a Committee of the whole House to consider of it. There was an extraordinary full House, and the following Vote passed upon the Question, with very general Consent, there being but two Negative Voices to it.

Resolved,

That an Address be made to the King, that his Majesty would be pleased to enter into a League Offensive and Defensive with the States General of the United Provinces, and to make such other Alliances with others of the Confederates, as his Majesty shall think fit against the Growth and Power of the French King, and for the Preservation of the Spanish-Netherlands; and that a Committee be appointed to draw up the Address, with Reasons why this House cannot comply with his Majesty's Speech, until such Alliances be entered into; and further shewing the Necessity of the speedy making such Alliances; and, when such Alliances are made, giving his Majesty assurance of speedy and chearful Supplies, from time to time, for supporting and maintaining such Alliances.

To which (the Speaker re-assuming the Chair, and this being reported) the House agreed and appointed a Committee.

And Adjourned over *Ascension-day* till Friday.

In the Interim, the Committee appointed met, and drew the Address according to the above-mentioned Order, a true Copy of which is here annexed.

May it please Your most Excellent Majesty,

Your Majesty's most Loyal and Dutiful Subjects, the Commons in Parliament Assembled, having taken into their serious Consideration, your Majesty's Gracious Speech, we do beseech your Majesty, to believe it is a great Affliction to them, to find themselves obliged (at present) to decline the granting your Majesty the Supply your Majesty is pleased to demand, conceiving it is not agreeable to the Usage of Parliament, to grant Supplies for maintenance of Wars and Alliances, before they are signified in Parliament (which the two Wars against the States of the United Provinces, since your Majesty's happy Restoration, and the League made with them in January, 1668. for Preservation of the Spanish-Netherlands, sufficiently prove, without troubling your Majesty with Instances of greater Antiquity) from which Usage, if we should depart, the Precedent might be of dangerous Consequence in future Times, though your Majesty's Goodness gives us great Security during your Majesty's Reign, which we beseech God long to continue.

This Consideration prompted us in our last Address to your Majesty, before our late Recess, humbly to mention to your Majesty, our Hopes, that before our Meeting again, your Majesty's Alliances might be so fixed, as that your Majesty might be Graciously pleased to impart them to us in Parliament, that so our earnest Desires of Supplying your Majesty, for Prosecuting those great Ends, we had humbly laid before your Majesty, might meet with no Impediment or Obstruction; being highly sensible of the Necessity of supporting, as well as making the Alliances, humbly desired in our former Addresses, and which we still conceive so important to the Safety of your Majesty and your Kingdoms, That we cannot (without Unfaithfulness to your Majesty and those we represent) omit upon all Occasions, humbly to beseech your Majesty, as we do now; To enter into a League, Offensive, and Defensive, with the States General of the United Provinces, against the Growth and Power of the French King, and for the Preservation of the Spanish-Netherlands,
and

and to make such other Alliances, with other such of the Confederates, as your Majesty shall think fit and useful to that end; in doing which (that no time may be lost) we humbly offer to your Majesty these Reasons for the expediting of it.

1. That if the entering into such Alliances should draw on a War with the French King, it would be less detrimental to your Majesty's Subjects at this time of the year, they having now fewest Effects within the dominion of that King.

2. That though we have great reason to believe the Power of the French King to be dangerous to your Majesty and your Kingdoms, when he shall be at more leisure to molest us; yet we conceive the many Enemies he has to deal with at present, together with the Situation of your Majesty's Kingdoms, the Unanimity of the People in this Cause, the Care your Majesty hath been pleased to take of your Ordinary Guard for the Sea, together with the Credit provided by the late Act, for an Additional Excise for three years, make the Entering into, and declaring Alliances very safe, until we may in a regular way give your Majesty such further Supplies, as may enable your Majesty to support your Alliances, and defend your Kingdoms.

3. Because of the great Danger and Charge which must necessarily fall upon your Majesty's Kingdoms, if (through want of that timely Encouragement and Assistance, which your Majesty, joyning with the States General of the United Provinces, and other the Confederates, would give them) The said States, or any other considerable part of the Confederates should this next Winter, or Summer, make a Peace or Truce with the French King (the Prevention whereof must hitherto be acknowledged a singular Effect of God's Goodness to us) which if it should happen, your Majesty would be afterwards necessitated with fewer, perhaps with no Alliances or Assistance to withstand the Power of the French King, which hath so long, and so successfully contended with so many and so Potent Adversaries; and whilst he continues his over-balancing Greatness, must always be dangerous to his Neighbours, since he would be able to oppress any one Confederate, before the rest could get together, and be in so good a Posture of offending him as they now are, being jointly engaged in a War. And if he should be so successful as to make a Peace, or disunite the present Confederation against him, it is much to be feared, whether

That it would be possible ever to re-unite it, at least it would be a work of so much time and difficulty, as would leave your Majesty's Kingdoms exposed to much Misery and Danger.

Having thus discharged our Duty, in laying before your Majesty the Dangers threatening your Majesty and your Kingdoms, and the only remedies we can think of, for the preventing, securing and quieting the minds of your Majesty's People, with some few of those Reasons which have moved us to this, and our former Addresses, on this Subject; We most humbly beseech your Majesty to take this matter into your most serious Consideration, and to take such resolutions, as may not leave it in the Power of any Neighbouring Prince, to rob your People of that Happiness which they enjoy, under your Majesty's gracious Government; beseeching your Majesty to rest confident and assured, that when your Majesty shall be pleased to declare such Alliances in Parliament, We shall hold our selves oblig'd, not only by our Promises and Assurances given, and now with great Unanimity renewed in a full House; but by the Zeal and Desires of those whom we represent, and by the Interests of all our Safeties, most cheerfully to give your Majesty such speedy Supplies and Assistances, as may fully and plentifully answer the Occasions, and by God's Blessing preserve your Majesty's Honour, and the Safety of the People.

All which is most humbly submitted to your Majesty's great Wisdom.

Friday May 25th. 1677.

Sir John Trevor Reported from the said Committee the Address, which was read and agreed to, and ordered that those Members of the House, who were of his Majesty's Privy Council, should move his Majesty to know his Pleasure, when the House might wait upon him, with their Address.

Saturday May 26th. 1677.

The House being sat, had notice, by Mr. Secretary Coventry, that the King would receive their Address at Three in the Afternoon; at which time they attended the King with it, at the Banqueting-house in White-Hall. Which being presented; the King Answered,

ed, That it was Long and of great Importance, that he would consider of it, and give them an Answer as soon as he could.

The House Adjourned till Monday, May the 28th. When being Sate, they receiv'd notice by Secretary Coventry, that the King expected them immediately in the Banqueting-House. Whither being come, The King made a Speech to them on the Subject of their Address, which Speech, to prevent mistakes, His Majesty read out of His Paper, and then delivered the same to the Speaker. And His Majesty added a few words about their Adjournment.

The King's Speech is as followeth,

Gentlemen,

Could I have been silent, I would rather have chosen to be so, than to call to mind things so unfit for you to meddle with, as are contained in some parts of your Late Addresses, wherein you have entrench'd upon so undoubted a Right of the Crown, that I am confident it will appear in no Age (when the Sword was not drawn) that the Prerogative of making Peace and War hath been so dangerously invaded.

You do not content your selves with desiring me to enter into such Leagues as may be for the safety of the Kingdom, but you tell me what sort of Leagues they must be, and with whom; and (as your Address is worded) it is more liable to be understood to be by your Leave, than at your Request, that I should make such other Alliances, as I please with other of the Confederates.

Should I suffer this Fundamental Power of making Peace and War to be so far Invaded (though but once) as to have the manner and circumstances of Leagues prescribed to me by Parliament, it's plain that no Prince or State would any longer believe that the Sovereignty of England rests in the Crown; Nor could I think my self to signifie any more to Foreign Princes, than the empty Sound of a King. Wherefore you may rest assured, that no Condition shall make me depart from, or lessen so essential a part of the Monarchy. And I am willing to believe so well of this House of Commons, that I am confident these ill Consequences are not intended by you.

These are in short the Reasons why I can by no means approve of your Address, and yet though you have declined to Grant Me that Supply which is necessary to the Ends of it, I do again Declare to you, That as

I have done all that lay in my Power since your last Meeting, so I will still apply my self by all the means I can, to let the World see my Care for the Security and Satisfaction of my People, although it may not be with those Advantages to them, which by your Assistances I might have procured.

And having said this, he signified to them, they should Adjourn till the 16th of July next. And upon meeting then, were Adjourned till the 3d day of December.

May it not be worth Remembring, who then advised K. Charles to frustrate the earnest desires of his People, and to make such an Answer to his Parliament.



FINIS.

